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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Information economics has been one of the major developments in the 
modern theory of microeconomics. It studies how information and the efforts 
to obtain, transmit or block it, affects the working of various socioeconomic 
systems. While the value of information has been known for a long time ago, 
the rigorous analysis of the role of information in shaping the structure of 
economic systems and the behavior of individuals is a lively topic for 
research. What make this field so rich is, on the one hand, the characteristic 
of information and, on the other hand, the multitude of channels through 
which it is learned, consumed and transmitted. Regarding characteristics of 
information, we should note that information is different from other types of 
valuable commodities as it is easily obtained but hard to verify. It contrasts 
with the most of other types of valuable commodities as they have a high 
price, but once acquired, the uncertainty regarding their quality disappears.  
Regarding the second part, it should be noted that social scientists are still 
investigating why different people consume information in different ways 
and the complexity of information transmission channels.  
Information economics was born in the 70s. Explicit treatments of 
information up to that time have been focused more on the informational role 
of prices of goods and services. For example,  Hayek  (1945) highlighted the 
importance of prices in a market economy for distributing information. These 
theories assumed that all participants have identical information about the 
quality and characteristics of goods and services. In the beginning of the 70s, 
however, economists started to research problems in which one party has 
superior information compared to the other party or parties. Rigorous 
analysis of problems with asymmetric information led to the birth of 
information economics as a major field. The classic article by Akerlof (1970) 
marks the formal introduction of information asymmetry in the literature. He 
analyzed the consequence of an information asymmetry in the market for 
second hand cars. Akerlof showed that the information asymmetry between 
the sellers and the buyers of second hand cars, results in deterioration of the 
average quality of available cars in the market. Subsequently,  Mirrlees 
(1971) analyzed a problem in which agents have different intrinsic 
productivity in an optimal taxation problem. To deal with the information 
asymmetry, two general methods have been introduced: signaling and 
screening (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005). The difference between these two 
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methods is that in signaling it is the informed party who takes an action to 
resolve information asymmetry, whereas in screening it is the uninformed 
party who takes action. Signaling is introduced by Spence (1973). He 
proposed that an informed party can credibly inform an uninformed party by 
taking a costly action that serves as a signal. For example, in the job market, 
employers do not know the ability of candidates. Therefore, high ability 
candidates might signal their ability by earning a college degree that is too 
costly for low ability candidates to earn. Stiglitz (1975) introduced a formal 
model of screening as a way for an uninformed party to extract information 
from the informed party. This happens by designing a menu of choices such 
that the optimal choice of the informed party reveals her private information. 
For example, an employer who does not know the productivity of job 
candidates might offer compensation packages that differ in the composition 
of contingent and non-contingent (fixed) bonuses. High productivity 
candidates favor contingent based packages, whereas low productivity ones 
favor non-contingent packages. The analysis of problems of asymmetric 
information with more than one agent is done in auction theory, which is 
developed by Myerson-Maskin-Milgrom (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 
1995) in various publications.   
A major development in information economic is the introduction of 
hidden actions where one party cannot observe the actions of the other party. 
For example, an employer does not observe how hard an employee works. 
This type of problems is analyzed first by Hölmstrom (1979). The key issue 
is designing a compensation package that compels the agent to behave in 
ways that the principal deems desirable. The theory of incomplete contracts 
by Grossman & Hart (1986) and Hart & Moore (1990) is another major 
development in information economics.  
This thesis applies the insights of information economics to organizations. 
Chapter 2 studies the governance structure of heterogeneous collective 
entrepreneurships. Heterogeneity implies that members have different 
outside options and are also different in terms of knowledgeability. This sort 
of heterogeneity can be observed between Senior and Junior members of 
professional firms such as law firms. Members having different outside 
options implies that there are some business opportunities that are acceptable 
for some members but not for the other members. As a result, decision 
making is hampered and members conflict. This problem is known in the 
literature as the homogeneity hypothesis of Hansmann (1996). It implies that 
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the efficient ownership of enterprise requires that control is granted to a 
group of stakeholders having highly homogeneous interests. Despite this, 
heterogeneous collectives are observed in some industries such as law firms, 
agricultural cooperatives and so on. The paper studies why heterogeneous 
collectives (entrepreneurships) exist in some industries but not in other 
industries. In doing so, the governance structure of collectives is analyzed as 
it allocates decision rights to members. The paper shows that governance 
structure and the market are intertwined and also determines the efficient 
governance structure across different market types.    
Chapter 3 studies the effect of managerial self-confidence and social 
status on organizational performance. It tackles the following puzzle in 
management science. On the one hand, various researchers have documented 
the observation that overconfident managers are favored by their followers, 
peers and investors. On the other hand, empirical evidence demonstrates that 
the link between confidence and competence is dubious. The inter-personal 
perspective researches the consequences of managerial confidence on the 
behavior of followers. The paper shows how managerial confidence 
influences followers' estimation of the manager's ability and how this, in turn, 
affects their effort level. This part provides an explanation for the observed 
positive link between managerial confidence and followers' perception of 
managerial ability and their effort provision. In addition, the paper studies 
how managerial concern for retaining and enhancing social status affects the 
organization.   
Chapter 4 analyzes documentation. A document is defined as a record 
showing the history of actions and information in the past. While the 
information that a document provides might not be verifiable, the very 
existence of the information is verifiable by the document. The paper 
explores why organizations use documents extensively and what are the 
consequences of documentation. The paper studies documentation as a multi-
purpose, multi-faceted activity and identifies three distinct functions for 
documentation: time saving, enforcing consistency and certification.    
Finally, chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the thesis. What connects 
the chapters of the thesis is the role of information in decision making and 
communication in organizations. In Chapter 2, information is about business 
opportunities in collectives. In Chapter 3, the information is about the ability 
of the managers and it's motivational and behavioral consequences. Chapter 
4 researches the inter-temporal transmission of information by 
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documentation and its effects on decision making and communication in 
organizations. 
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Chapter 3: Social Image, Self-Confidence and 
Organizational Behavior 
This article analyzes the effects of self-confidence and social 
image on managerial performance in a model where the firm 
implements projects with stochastic returns and the manager cares 
about her social image. Three results are established. First, followers 
might exert a higher effort when the manager is confident compared 
to an unconfident manager despite knowing that there is a negative 
relationship between confidence and ability. This happens when the 
followers who are aware of the relationship between confidence and 
ability also know that a sufficient fraction of followers believe there 
is a direct association between confidence and ability. Second, image 
concern imposes a cost on organization because the manager is 
committed to implement inferior projects in order to save face. Our 
analysis therefore provides a behavioral explanation for commitment 
escalation. Third, managers with a high or low status are less 
vulnerable to image loss, compared to managers with an 
intermediate status, when it comes to correct a failed course of 
action. Image preservation is therefore the problem of middle status 
managers. 
Keywords: Self-confidence, managerial social image, 
commitment escalation 
 
1. Introduction 
The relentless quest of individuals to find the thinnest signs 
confirming their ability, while forgetting the strongest evidence 
implying lack of ability, has caught the attention of philosophers and 
social scientist and even biologists (Garrett and Sharot (2017)). In 
economics, it had been believed for a long time that having the most 
accurate information about any parameter, including the ability of 
the self, is pivotal for making optimal decisions and maximizing 
welfare. This view, however, has been challenged as an 
overwhelming number of studies, experiments and lab tests have 
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confirmed a positive association between possessing a positive self-
assessment and a constellation of desirable, welfare enhancing 
outcomes (Lane et al. (2004)). Social scientists have documented not 
only the prevalence of inflated self-assessment among individuals 
with diverse backgrounds, but also the benevolent implications of 
having a positive self-assessment for psychological health and the 
general well-being of individuals. As a result, economists are trying 
to unveil the deep roots of the need for self-confidence, the strategies 
people follow to maintain their self-confidence and its various 
implications for economic decisions. 
This article investigates confidence and social image from a social 
perspective. Empirical evidence poses an important puzzle. On the 
one hand, we know that most people think they are smarter and more 
capable than they actually are (Alicke and Sedikides (2009)). On the 
other hand, a number of studies show that overconfident managers 
are better received by their followers, peers and investors. For 
example, Anderson et al. (2012) and Kennedy et al. (2013) provide 
evidence that overconfidence, even when unjustified, results in a 
higher social status and a higher social evaluation of the manager’s 
skills. In another example, Phua et al. (2018) show that 
overconfident managers induce more supplier commitment, stronger 
labor commitment and less turnover. Therefore, it seems that most 
people, including managers, are unduly confident and these 
overconfident managers are favored by their followers, peers and 
investors. This article aims to shed light on this puzzle. 
We analyze the effect of the managerial self-confidence on 
motivating the followers. A positive association between 
competence and confidence results in confident managers eliciting 
higher effort and commitment from their followers than unconfident 
managers. The interesting case, however, happens if there is no 
relationship or even a negative relationship between confidence and 
competence. We show that even in the latter case, a confident 
manager might be more successful in motivating the followers 
compared to a more competent but unconfident manager. To show 
the underlying mechanism, we assume that there are two types of 
followers. Experts, who are aware of the negative relationship 
between confidence and competence, and non-experts who assume, 
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incorrectly, that confidence implies competence. We show that 
experts prefer a confident manager to an unconfident manager if two 
conditions are met. First, if a large fraction of followers is non-
expert. Second, if managerial and followers’ inputs are highly 
substitutable. 
Next, we analyze the relationship between managerial status 
(social image) and reversing a failed business initiative. The analysis 
assumes an industry culture where managerial status is damaged in 
case the manager aborts the business initiative. One might think that 
a high managerial status, or social image, resembles a vulnerable 
asset that has to be taken care of and, subsequently, a high-status 
manager is less likely to reverse her decision following receiving 
new information. We show that this intuition is not correct. This is 
since image loss (status loss) is not monotonic with the initial value. 
That is, status loss initially increases with the status but decreases 
afterwards. In other words, a manager with a very high status is less 
vulnerable to image loss than a manager with a lower status. This 
non-monotonicity in turn implies that image concern is mostly the 
problem of managers with moderate status. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces 
the relevant literature in psychology and economics and positions 
the paper in the literature. Section 3 presents the model. In Section 4 
we solve the model and derive the equilibria of the game. Section 5 
studies the welfare consequences of image concern. Section 6 
presents comparative statics. In Section 7 an extension is presented 
and, finally, Section 8 summarizes the results and present possible 
avenues for future research. 
2. Related literature 
Overconfidence has been researched both from an intra-personal 
perspective and also from an inter-personal, social perspective. The 
intra-personal perspective researches the possible causes and 
potential effects of overconfidence for the psychological, biological 
and financial wellbeing of people. The inter-personal perspective on 
overconfidence studies how overconfidence affects the relationship 
of an individual with the society. In psychology, the seminal article 
of Dunning and Kruger (1999) proposes that individuals are biased 
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when it comes to assess their own ability. Subsequent studies 
provide some support for this hypothesis and show that there is a 
moderate relationship between how people evaluate themselves and 
objective measures of their performance (Dunning et al. (2004); Zell 
and Krizan (2014)). In economics, developments in behavioural 
economics have brought overconfidence to the forefront of the 
research agenda for theorists as well as empirical/experimental 
researchers.1 The economic literature distinguishes the instrumental 
effect of overconfidence from the hedonic (affective) effect. The 
instrumental effect is beneficial when it counteracts the adverse 
effects of an incomplete self-control, time inconsistency or some 
forms of irrationality. For instance, the logic for the case of time 
inconsistency goes like this. When there is a delay between costly 
effort provision and the ensuing reward, time inconsistency results 
in procrastination and low effort provision because the cost of 
exerting effort is disproportionately felt high (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999)). An inflated view of the self-mitigates this problem 
by pushing up the subjective perception of the chance of success and 
thereby counteracting against procrastination. That is, an inflated 
view of the self-counteracts the tendency to procrastinate (Benabou 
and Tirole (2002); Benabou and Tirole (2004)).2 The hedonic 
perspective on overconfidence assumes that people derive utility 
merely from thinking positively or anticipating positive outcomes in 
the future (Koszegi¨ (2010); Benabou (2013)). Contrary to the 
instrumental case, this type of anticipatory utility is mostly 
detrimental since it results in distorted choices and making sub-
optimal decisions. Benabou and Tirole (2016) provide a review of 
the topic of beliefs, including belief about self. This paper does not 
research overconfidence from an intra-personal perspective but takes 
 
1 Note that our interpretation of overconfidence is concentrated on the difference 
between the subjective evaluation and objective measures of performance and not on 
how people rank their themselves among others or their subjective placement. We do 
not, therefore, consider the effect of overconfidence on specific business decisions such 
as industry entry (Camerer and Lovallo 1999) or information acquisition in financial 
market (Garc´ıa et al. 2007). 
2 A related paper about the effect of incomplete self-control is Carrillo and Mariotti (2000). They 
show that individuals might strategically stop learning if they know that they are not able to 
commit to a future action. This article highlights information about ability and self. 
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overconfidence as an exogenous phenomenon and then analyzes its 
consequences in motivating others. 
The inter-personal perspective on overconfidence builds on the 
premise that people care about their status or social image (Anderson 
et al. (2015)). This concern for preserving a positive social image is 
so strong that people take (or refrain from taking) obviously harmful 
(beneficial) actions to protect their social image (Bursztyn et al. 
(2018); Lacetera and Macis (2010)). Given the importance of social 
image, it is not a surprise that overconfidence functions as a tool for 
social signaling and strategic considerations (Burks et al. (2013)). 
This paper studies overconfidence from an inter-personal 
perspective and build on the premise that people care about their 
social image. 
Finally, our paper analyzes the consequences of managerial 
overconfidence and image concerns on the firm. The organizational 
effects of CEO overconfidence have been analyzed in a number of 
papers. For example, Gervais et al. (2011) show that overconfident 
managers are more attractive to firms since firms are able to 
compensate them with flatter compensation packages. Goel and 
Thakor (2008) show that overconfident managers are more likely to 
be promoted and overconfidence is value enhancing up to a point 
when the manager is risk averse. On the other hand, overconfident 
managers are overly sensitive to the investment-cash flow ratio and 
engage more in value destroying activities according to Malmendier 
and Tate (2005 and 2009). Our paper is similar since we analyze the 
effect of managerial confidence on firm performance. However, our 
analysis includes both the direct channel and an indirect channel 
through which overconfidence affects organizations. Finally, our 
analysis of the effects of image preservation provides a new insight 
for the phenomenon of escalation of commitment outlined by (Staw 
(1981) and Bowen (1987)). 
3. The Model 
Players: A firm consists of a manager and a unit mass of 
followers. The firm intends to implement a project. Projects have a 
stochastic return R ≥ 0 with a known CDF, F(R). A good project (G) 
returns at least as much as an outside option that yields r >0. A bad 
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project (B) yields less than r. The manager is characterized by her 
ability and her confidence. The ability of the manager is either high 
H or low L. The proportion of high ability managers is σ in the 
society. A fraction αH (αL) of high (low) ability managers are 
confident (C). The other managers are unconfident (U). There are 
two types of followers: experts (E) who comprise a fraction 1−γ of 
the followers and non-experts (N) comprising a fraction γ of the 
followers. 
Beliefs: Experts are rational, i.e., use Bayes’ rule to form and 
update beliefs. Non-experts have distorted beliefs. They presume αH 
=1, αL =0 and γ =1. That is, non-experts believe that there is a direct 
and deterministic relationship between confidence and ability. In 
addition, non-experts believe that there is no difference between them 
and the experts. 
 
Actions: There are six decisions. First, the choice of the project 
must be made. A high ability manager chooses a good project with 
probability 1−β and a bad project with probability β. A low ability 
manager always chooses a bad project. Second, the manager chooses 
a minimum acceptable return for the project denoted by Rmin. Third, 
experts choose whether to investigate (I) the project or not (N). If 
they investigate, then they discern the true return of the project with 
certainty. Fourth, experts decide whether to communicate (C) or 
remain silent (S) following the investigation. If they do not 
investigate, then they remain silent. Fifth, the manager decides 
whether to proceed (P) with the project or abort (A) it. If the manager 
decides not to proceed with the project, then R =r >0. Not proceeding 
with the project can be interpreted as implementing a safe project 
with a deterministic return equal to r. Finally, experts (non-experts) 
choose the effort level 𝑒𝐸(𝑒𝑁). 
 
Information structure: Neither the manager nor the followers 
observe the return of the project and the manager’s ability. The 
manager and the followers just observe whether the manager is 
confident or not. Experts know the true return of the project only if 
they investigate the project. In addition, they are aware that non-
experts have distorted beliefs.3 
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Payoffs: The final return is a function of the project’s return and 
followers’ effort. It is denoted by 𝑣(𝑒𝑁, 𝑒𝐸 , 𝑅) and specified by the 
following CES production function 
 
 
where ν is the substitution parameter. The manager receives a 
portion y of the final return. The manager cares also about her social 
image or status among the experts. We reflect these considerations 
of the manager in a separable utility function given by 
       𝑈 =  𝑦𝑣(𝑒𝑁 , 𝑒𝐸 , 𝑅) − 𝐼(∆𝜌𝐻) . ∆𝜌𝐻                                    (1) 
where ρH represent the social belief that the manager is high ability. 
The social belief is defined as the belief of outside stakeholders 
about the manager. These stakeholders include investors, business 
analysts, prospective employers, and so on. That is, the manager 
does not care about her status among the subordinates and cares only 
about how outsiders think about her. ∆𝜌𝐻  is the change in the belief 
after project implementation. The indicator function 𝐼(∆𝜌𝐻)is defined 
as 
 
First, it represents the prominence of retaining status because zero is 
highlighted. Second, it reflects a key insight of Prospect Theory that 
losses loom larger than gains (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)).3 
Non-experts exert a costly effort 𝑒𝑁  and receive 1−y of the return 
of the project. Their utility is given by 
 
3 A similar specification has been applied by Gabaix 
and Laibson  (2006) in another context. 
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                                 𝑈 = (1 − 𝑦)𝑣(𝑒𝑁 , 𝑒𝐸 , 𝑅) − 𝐶(𝑒𝑁)         (2) 
where C(e) is continuous, increasing and convex. 
Experts’ stake is also (1 − y). The cost of investigating the project 
is S > 0. In addition, they receive a positive utility, T >0, if the 
manager changes her decision as a result of their feedback. The 
utility function of experts is given by 
 
(3) 
Timing of events: Nature determines the followers’ type, 
manager’s type (ability and confidence) and the profitability of the 
project. The manager chooses the minimum acceptable return for the 
project. Experts choose whether to investigate the project or not. If 
the experts investigate, they decide whether to communicate the 
return to the manager or remain silent. If the experts communicate, 
the manager decides whether to proceed with the project or not. 
Finally, both types of followers choose their effort level and payoffs 
are realized. Figure 1 depicts the timing of the game. The extensive 
form of the game is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 1:Timing of events 
4. Equilibrium 
   The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore, 
we start with the last decision, i.e., the effort provision of the 
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followers in 4.1. In Subsection 4.2 the decision of the manager 
regarding project continuation is analyzed. The investigation and 
communication decisions of the experts are addressed in Subsection 
4.3. Finally, the decision of the manager regarding the minimum 
acceptable return is addressed in Subsection 4.4. 
4.1. Followers’ effort 
We analyze the effort provision of both types of followers when 
the manager is confident and compare it with the case when the 
manager is not confident. Followers choose their effort level so as to 
maximize their expected income. Given the payoff functions (2) and 
(3), the equilibrium effort level depends on the followers’ effort and 
the project’s profitability R. Both experts and non-experts have to 
estimate the project’s return based on the manager’s ability. Recall 
that the followers observe only whether the manager is confident or 
not. Define 𝜑𝐾, k ∈ {C,U} as the probability that the manager has 
high ability depending on whether she is confident (C) or 
unconfident (U). Rationality requires the followers to use the Bayes 
formula to assess the relationship between ability and confidence. 
As a result, followers’ perception of a confident manager being of 
high ability is 
                                                                       (4) 
When the manager is unconfident, this perception is given by 
                                                (5) 
Critical for our analysis is whether 𝜑𝐶>σ or not. If the answer is yes, 
then a confident manager is assessed more favorably than a manager 
who is not confident. In other words, confidence is interpreted by the 
followers as a sign of competence. From (4) we can check that 𝜌𝐶  > 
σ if and only if 𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐿. This is intuitive, if high ability managers 
are more likely to be confident than low ability managers, then 
confidence increases the likelihood that a manager is high type. 
Therefore, the value of confidence is clear when αL ≤ αH since 
followers will exert more effort when the manager is confident 
compared to the case when the manager is not confident. If 𝛼𝐻 <
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𝛼𝐿, i.e., 𝜑𝐶  < 𝜎, then confident managers are less likely to be high 
type than unconfident managers. Experts, being Bayesian and 
having correct information, are aware of the fact that 𝛼𝐿 > 𝛼𝐻  entails 
𝜑𝐶 < 𝜎. Non-experts’ distorted belief regarding αi,i ∈{H,L} implies 
that φC =1 and φU =0. 
Consider first the non-experts. Non-experts think of the confident 
manager as a high ability one. Define 𝑅𝑘
𝑗
 as the estimation of project’s 
return by follower j ∈ {E,N} facing a manager k ∈ {C,U}. Non-
experts’ estimation of the projects’ return when the manager is 
confident is 
𝑅𝐶
𝑁  = (1 − 𝛽)𝐸(𝑅 | 𝑅 ≥ 𝑟) + 𝛽𝐸(𝑅 |𝑅 < 𝑟) 
and when the manager is unconfident 𝑅𝑈
𝑁 = 𝐸(𝑅 | 𝑅 < 𝑟). 
Obviously, RC
N >RU
N. In addition, recall that non-experts have a 
distorted belief. As a result, non-experts think that 𝑒𝑁 = 𝑒𝐶. A 
consequence of this misconception is that non-experts assume the 
production function is [𝑒𝑁
𝜐 + 𝑅𝜐]
1
𝜐. Define 𝑒𝑁𝐶(𝑒𝑁𝑈) as the effort 
provision of non-experts when the manager is (un)confident. Define 
𝑒𝑁𝐶
∗  as the solution to 
                                            (6) 
When the manager is unconfident, RC
N is substituted with RU
N in (6). 
Obviously, non-experts exert more effort when the manager is 
confident compared to the case when the manager is not confident 
since RC
N >RU
N. That is, 𝑒𝑁𝐶
∗ > 𝑒𝑁𝑈
∗  . 
   Next, consider the experts. The estimation of the projects return is 
easy in nine of the ten information sets because the experts know the 
true return, and therefore do not have to estimate the true return from 
the managers confidence. Eight of these information sets entail the 
choice investigation by the experts, i.e. the experts have learned the 
true value of the project by investigation. The ninth information set 
consists of the decision not to proceed by the manager when the 
experts have not investigated the project. This results in R =r. 
Experts will provide a higher level of effort with a confident 
manager than an unconfident manager in these nine cases because 
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non-experts exert a higher effort when the manager is confident. The 
tenth information set is characterized by experts not investigating the 
project and the manager chooses to proceed with the project. The 
experts’ estimation of the project’s return when the manager is 
confident is given by  
      𝑅𝐶
𝐸  = 𝜑
𝐶
{(1 − 𝛽)𝐸(𝑅 | 𝑅 ≥ 𝑟) + 𝛽𝐸(𝑅 |𝑅 < 𝑟)} + (1 − 𝜑
𝐶
)𝐸(𝑅 |𝑅 < 𝑟)    (7)                                                                           
  Obviously, RC
E <RC
N. Experts are aware that there are non-experts 
who exert a higher effort when the manager is confident. Therefore, 
they face a tradeoff. On the one hand, non-experts exert a higher 
effort when the manager is confident, but on the other hand, being 
confident implies lower ability. Expert solve the following problem 
when the manager is confident 
                                  (8)  
    Denote the optimal solution to this problem by 𝑒𝐸𝐶
∗ . When the manager is 
unconfident, then experts solve instead 
                            (9) 
where 𝑅𝑈
𝐸 is the expected return when the manager is not confident. 
It is derived by substituting 𝜑𝐶  by 𝜑𝑈  in (7). Denote the optimal 
solution of (9) by 𝑒𝐸𝑈
∗ . It is shown in the Appendix 2 that 𝑒𝐸𝐶
∗ > 𝑒𝐸𝑈
∗  
if and only if 
                                      (10) 
where A is a constant. Condition (10) relates the fraction of non-
experts to the elasticity of substitution between the managerial ability 
and followers’ effort and (RU
E −RC
E). It says that experts exert a 
higher effort with a confident manager than with an unconfident 
manager when two conditions are met. First, there is a sufficient 
number of non-experts. Second, managerial input and followers’ 
input are highly substitutable. 
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The following proposition summarizes the analysis. Note that (10) 
is trivially satisfied for all ν and γ >0 when 𝜑𝐶  ≥σ.
4 So, we state the 
proposition only for the complementary case. 
PROPOSITION 1. If 𝜑𝐶  < σ, i.e., confidence and ability are 
negatively related, experts exert a higher effort with a confident 
manager than with an unconfident manager, when 
1- There are a sufficient number of non-experts; 
2- Managerial ability and followers’ effort are highly substitutable. 
The main insight of Proposition 1 is that experts exert a higher 
effort when the manager is confident, compared to the case when the 
manager is unconfident, despite knowing that confidence is 
negatively associated with ability (competence). This happens 
because they know that a confident manager motivates a lot of non-
experts. This in turn, compensates for the possible lack of 
competence of the manager. In other words, the production 
technology of the organization is such that having the followers exert 
high effort is more effective in boosting the production than putting 
a competent manager at the helm. This result can also shed light on 
the role and effect of charismatic leadership. We can reinterpret and 
substitute confidence with charisma. A charismatic leader is 
distinguished by a constellation of attributes that followers perceive 
about her. While the nature of these attributes and the ability of 
leaders to attain and maintain them is a subject of debate among 
management scholars, there is a consensus that charismatic leaders 
are able to motivate their followers by means other than extrinsic 
rewards (Conger (2015)). Our analysis implies that charismatic 
leaders might be able to motivate followers who seriously doubt 
their competence if sufficiently many believers are around. 
4.2. Project Continuation Decision 
It is worthwhile to review the belief system of the manager before 
analyzing the equilibrium strategy. Recall that the manager is either 
 
4 This is due to the fact that φC ≥σ implies RCE ≥RUE which makes the ratio of the left-hand side of (10) 
negative. 
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confident or unconfident. If the manager is confident, then her prior 
belief about the project is given by 
𝑃(𝑅 ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 𝜑𝐶(1 − 𝛽) 
𝑃(𝑅 < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 1 − 𝜑𝐶(1 − 𝛽) 
In case the manager is unconfident, then 𝜑𝐶  in the above equations 
should be replaced by 𝜑𝑈. Next, note that before the manager makes 
the proceed decision, the experts either communicate or do not 
communicate. In case the experts do not communicate, the manager 
has no new information to update and therefore her beliefs do not 
change from what they were at the beginning of the game. In case the 
experts communicate, the manager updates her beliefs based on the 
message. Assume that the message of the experts is verifiable. If the 
message indicates that 𝑅 < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛, then the manager learns with 
certainty that the return is less than the minimum acceptable return, 
i.e., 𝑃(𝑅 ≥  𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 0. If the message indicates that 𝑅 ≥  𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛, 
then the manager learns with certainty that the project yields equal or 
more than the minimum acceptable return. That is, 𝑃(𝑅 ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) =
1. Given the belief system of the manager, it is obvious that the 
manager aborts the project whenever experts communicate that 𝑅 <
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 and proceeds otherwise. 
 
 
4.3. Experts Investigating the Project and Communicating to the Manager 
    Before sending the feedback to the manager, experts need to 
investigate the project. Investigation entails a cost S. If the feedback 
contradicts the manager but does not change her decision, i.e., they 
are not heard, then investigating the project is wasteful and even 
detrimental as it results in a disagreement with the manager. If, on 
the other hand, their feedback results in the manager changing her 
implementation decision, then experts are pivotal and receive a 
reward of size T. Experts investigate only when T > S. Suppose that 
T > S. Experts are aware that the manager does not proceed only if 
𝑅 < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛. That is, they know that they become pivotal only when 
the project yields less than the minimum acceptable return. In case 
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experts investigate and discover that the return is higher than Rmin, 
they are indifferent between remaining silent and truthfully 
communicating 𝑅 > 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛  as in both cases the manager implements 
the project.5 To analyze the investigation decision of the experts, 
note that investigation entails a certain cost (S) and an uncertain 
reward (T). Experts investigate the project only if the expected value 
of investigation is equal or more than its cost. It implies 
                              (11)       
The reward on the right-hand side of (11) is multiplied by (1 −
𝜑𝑘(1 − 𝛽))𝐹(𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛)/𝐹(𝑟). This is the probability that the manager 
chooses a project that yields less than 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛. If the manager did not 
lower the minimum acceptable return, then the reward would be 
multiplied by (1 − 𝜑𝑘(1 − 𝛽)) >  (1 − 𝜑𝑘(1 − 𝛽))𝐹(𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛). Therefore, 
lowering the minimum acceptable return dilutes the incentive of 
experts to investigate the project. We can restate (11) and consider 
the case when  
 
It refers to a situation when experts would have investigated the 
project, had the manager not lowered the minimum acceptable 
return. From (11) we can immediately conclude that for any triple 
{𝜑𝑘, 𝐹(. ),
𝑆
𝑇
}, there exist a critical value for the minimum acceptable 
return 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗  below which experts do not investigate the project. 
LEMMA 1. Experts investigate the project when (11) is satisfied. 
There exist a lower bound for the minimum acceptable return, 
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗ > 0, such that experts do not investigate the project if the 
minimum acceptable return is less than the lower bound  
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗ . Experts communicate the outcome of an investigation 
 
5 They might even have slight preference to communicate 𝑅 ≥ 𝑟 when  𝑅 > 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 to please the 
manager, but the message being verifiable implies that the manager can not be lied to. 
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when the return is equal or lower than the minimum acceptable 
return. 
4.4. Choosing the Minimum Acceptable Return 
In determining the minimum acceptable return, the manager does 
not only consider her material payoff, but also takes the social 
consequences of reversing a decision into account. The manager 
enters the period with a given status 𝜌𝐻, which represents the social 
belief that the manager is high ability. If she does not change her 
mind following the feedback and implements the project, then her 
social image does not change from what it was. That is, if the 
manager implements the project, then her status remains intact. If, 
on the other hand, the manager changes her mind, i.e., aborts the 
project, then her image is tarnished as people see this as a sign of 
weakness. In other words, stakeholders expect decisiveness and 
confidence from a competent manager (Ashford (1986)). 
Stakeholders update their belief about the manager upon aborting the 
project according to 
 
                                                          (12) 
where Ci, i ∈ {L, H} is the probability that a manager of type i ∈ {L, 
H} changes her mind. An industry that expects a competent manager 
to be decisive assumes CL > CH. An industry that expects revision 
assumes CL ≤ CH. The relationship between CH and CL is an 
indication of the industry culture. If CL >CH, then (12) implies 
𝜌𝐻|𝐶 < 𝜌𝐻 
that is, changing the implementation decision tarnishes the social 
image of the manager because the stakeholders interpret it as a signal 
of hesitation and indecisiveness. However, it is not only the industry 
culture that determines the image loss. The initial image of the 
manager also affects the size of this loss. Denote the status (social 
image) loss function by 𝐿(𝜌𝐻, 𝐶𝐿). It is defined as 
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                           𝐿(𝜌𝐻, 𝐶𝐿) ≡ 𝜌𝐻  − 𝜌𝐻|𝐶                             (13) 
   The manager determines the optimal minimum acceptable return 
by minimizing the total costs, which consists of the costs of 
implementing inferior projects and the costs of image (status) loss. 
Therefore, the manager determines the optimal 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 by minimizing 
the total costs with respect to 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛. The total cost function, depending 
on the manager’s confidence k ∈{C,U}, is given by 
 
 
The first term in the curly bracket represents the expected costs of 
image loss. The second term in the curly bracket shows the expected 
cost of implementing projects that yield less than r. Denote the 
optimal solution of (14) by 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗∗ . Recall from Lemma 1 that there 
exist a lower bound on the minimum acceptable return, denoted by 
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗ , such that experts never investigate the project when 
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗ . So, if 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗∗ < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗  , experts do not investigate the 
project at all. Therefore, when 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗∗ < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗  the manager has to 
compare the total cost in (14) when 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗∗  with the total cost 
when the experts do not investigate. This latter cost, depending on the 
manager’s confidence k ∈ {C, U}, equals 
 
                     (15) 
If the optimum total cost in (14) is less than (15), then the optimal 
value of the minimum acceptable return is 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗∗ . Otherwise, the 
manager is indifferent between setting 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 equal to any value less 
than 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗ . In any case, the optimal value of the minimum acceptable 
return is always less than r. In addition, the higher the social loss 
from aborting the project, the lower the minimum acceptable return. 
PROPOSITION 2. Managerial image concern results in 
implementing inferior projects, i.e., projects that yield less than r. The 
minimum acceptable return is inversely related to the social loss 
function. 
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5. Welfare Analysis 
We showed that when the manager is confident, both the experts 
and non-experts exert a higher effort compared to the case when the 
manager is unconfident. As a result, the total effort and production 
is higher when the manager is confident. Non-experts provide a 
higher effort when the manager is confident as they equate 
confidence with ability. Their effort level is inefficiently high unless 
𝛼𝐿 = 0, i.e., low ability managers are never confident. Experts, 
however, provide an efficient effort level given their information 
about the manager’s ability and the effort level of non-experts. The 
over-provision of effort by non-experts increases the payoffs of the 
experts and the manager. Confidence creates a rent for the manager 
and experts at the cost of non-experts. The welfare effect of 
confidence is not straightforward. It reduces the payoff of non-
experts and increases the payoffs of the experts and the manager. 
PROPOSITION 3. Managerial confidence increases the payoffs of 
the manager and the experts and decreases the payoff of the non-
experts. 
Next, recall that the manager’s concern for preserving her image 
results in discouraging the experts to investigate the project on the 
one hand, and implementing inferior projects on the other hand. As 
a result, a managerial image concern imposes a cost on the 
organization. Unlike confidence, the welfare effect of image concern 
is clearly negative because it reduces the payoff of everyone but the 
manager. 
PROPOSITION 4. Managerial image concern is welfare 
decreasing. 
    6. Comparative Statics 
We defined the image (status) loss function in (13). It is insightful 
to see how it changes with the initial status of the manager. 
Interestingly, the status loss changes non-monotonically with the 
initial level of social image. The loss first increases with ρH and then 
decreases. 
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PROPOSITION 5. There is a threshold 𝜌𝐻
∗  such that the status loss 
function L is increasing in 𝜌𝐻  when the status is 𝜌𝐻 < 𝜌𝐻
∗
 and 
decreasing afterwards. In addition, the cross derivative of the loss 
function with respect to CL and 𝜌𝐻 is negative. 
, ,  
   Proposition 5 implies that the cost of revising the implementation 
decision first increases and then decreases with the status of the 
manager. This result can be interpreted intuitively in the following 
way. A low status manager does not have much to lose. Reversing 
the decision dilutes her image. However, the damage is not large 
because the initial stock was not large in the first place. A high-status 
manager does not lose much either, but for a different reason. This 
time, the initial prestige protects the manager’s status. As a 
consequence, a manager with a very high social image finds it less 
costly to revise her decisions compared to a manager with a lower 
status. It seems that preserving status is most costly for managers 
with an intermediate status. This result provides an integrative 
explanation for the experimental results of Fast et al. (2014) that 
identify self-efficacy as the main driver of support for employee 
voice and Burks et al. (2013) that find social signaling the key 
function of overconfidence. Next, note that the manager sets the 
minimum acceptable return by striking a balance between the cost 
of implementing inferior projects and the cost of image loss. From 
Proposition 5 we know that the image loss function is non-
monotonic in 𝜌𝐻  and decreasing when 𝜌𝐻  is high. Therefore, a high-
status manager imposes less costs to the organization, by 
implementing inferior projects, as she is less vulnerable to image 
loss. In other words, a manager with a high social capital (status) 
rejects bad projects easier than a manages with less social capital. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the minimum acceptable 
return and the manager’s status. 
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COROLLARY 1. The portfolio of projects implemented by the 
manager changes non-monotonically with her status. A manager with 
a very high or very low status implements more profitable projects 
compared to a manager with an intermediate status. 
 
Figure 2: The Minimum Acceptable Return and Managerial Status. 
  
Next, recall from 4.4 that the manager has to decide whether to 
induce the experts to investigate by setting the minimum acceptable 
return. We analyze how the managerial status and managerial stake 
in the project affect this decision. Consider managerial status. First, 
from (11) we see that a high managerial status discourages the 
experts from investigation as they expect a high status manager to 
select good projects in the first place and this in turn implies that a 
higher 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 is needed to induce them to investigate. So, the manager 
must pick a higher 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 to compel them to investigate. Doing so, 
however, decreases the expected benefits of receiving feedback for 
the manager. To see why, note from (14) that when 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛  increases, 
the second component of the cost decreases. That is, the average 
return of projects that are filtered are not much below r. In addition, 
the first term in (14) changes non-monotonically (Proposition 5) 
with status. Therefore, the overall effect of status on 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 is not 
straightforward. The effect of managerial stake y is clear. From (14) 
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we see that increasing the managerial stake in the project increases 
the cost of implementing inferior projects and, as a result, puts an 
upward pressure on 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
PROPOSITION 6. Increasing the managerial stake increases the 
likelihood that the manager induces the experts to investigate the 
project. There is a threshold for managerial status 𝜌𝐻
∗  such that if a 
manager with status 𝜌𝐻
∗∗ < 𝜌𝐻
∗
 does not induce the experts to 
investigate, then also all managers whose status are in the range  
𝜌𝐻
∗∗<𝜌𝐻  <𝜌𝐻
∗  will not induce the experts to investigate. 
Finally, recall from (12) that the social image of the manager is 
affected when she aborts the project as  
                  
We defined industry culture by CL − CH. If CL = CH, then 𝜌 𝐻|𝐶 = 𝜌𝐻. 
Therefore, the industry culture determines how reversing the course 
affects the social image of the manager. The more open the culture, 
the less managerial status is damaged upon changing course. In an 
industry culture where people value feedback, the manager feels less 
pressed to appear assured of her decisions. As a result, the manager 
is more attentive to conflicting information in her decision making. 
In addition, note that the loss function 𝐿(𝜌𝐻, 𝐶𝐿) implies that two 
managers with the same level of social capital, identical 𝜌𝐻, might 
act differently in different organizations depending on the industry 
culture. 
COROLLARY 2. Industry culture affects the portfolio of projects 
implemented by the organization. Organizations operating in more 
open cultures are more conducive to implement profitable projects. 
   7. Unverifiable messages 
We showed in 4.3 that the manager reverses her decision 
following a contradicting feedback when she can verify the 
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messages. A more realistic case, however, might be that the manager 
cannot verify the message of the experts or that the manager does 
not agree with their evaluation. For instance, the manager and 
experts might evaluate the same project from different perspectives. 
Experts concentrate more on the operational and marketing aspects 
of launching a new product, while the manager thinks more 
strategically about the long-term effects of introducing the product 
on the position of the firm in the market and the reactions of 
competitors and investors. An immediate result is that 
communication becomes coarse, as is well known in the cheap talk 
literature (Crawford and Sobel (1982)). Experts will always 
announce that the return is lower than the minimum acceptable 
return whenever they find that the return is lower than r. 
LEMMA 2. Communication becomes noisy when the message is 
non-verifiable. There are two equilibrium messages: if the return is 
lower than the return of the outside option r, experts are indifferent 
between sending any value indicating that the return is lower than 
the minimum acceptable return to the manager. Otherwise, if the 
return is higher than r, then experts are indifferent between sending 
any value indicating that the return is higher than the minimum 
return to the manager. The manager considers any message 
implying that the return is less than the minimum acceptable return 
as an indication that the return is less than r. 
The noisy communication implies that the manager does not believe 
the value sent by the experts when it is lower than the minimum 
acceptable return. Following such a message, the manager updates 
her evaluation of the project’s return and obtains a posterior belief 
on the return as 
?̂?  = 𝐸(𝑅 | 𝑅 < 𝑟) 
The manager has to determine the minimum acceptable return 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 
and implement the project only if ?̂? ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗ . If the posterior is higher 
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than the minimum acceptable return, i.e., ?̂? ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗ , then the 
manager always implements the project following a negative 
feedback. In this case the experts will not bother investigating the 
project in the first place knowing that their feedback will never be 
pivotal. The expected payoff to the manager, of setting 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 < ?̂?, 
equals 
If the minimum acceptable return is set below Rˆ, then the manager 
aborts the project following a negative feedback. However, for the 
experts to investigate the project, 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 should still be sufficiently 
high to satisfy (11). Therefore, if the manager wants to induce the 
agent to investigate, she must set the minimum acceptable return 
somewhere in the range between 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 and ?̂?
 (assuming 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 < ?̂? ). 
Aborting the project following a negative feedback in combination 
with the Lemma 2 implies that experts send a negative feedback 
whenever their evaluation shows that the return is less than r. The 
expected payoff to the manager in this case is 
  (17) 
Comparing the payoffs of the manager when she aborts the project 
following a negative feedback (17) with the case when she always 
implements the project (16), shows that the manager aborts the 
project following a negative feedback when 
 
                       (18) 
This represents the incentive of the manager to induce the experts to 
investigate when communication is noisy. Note the similarity of this 
condition with (15). The difference is that (15) is multiplied by F(r) 
and is therefore less than the right hand side of (18). The difference 
implies that the manager has a stronger incentive to discourage the 
experts to investigate when the message is not verifiable. 
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8. Summary and Conclusion 
This article investigates the consequences of self-confidence and 
image concerns in organizations. We analyze the effect of the 
manager’s confidence on the followers’ effort provision. The 
analysis shows that even if confidence is negatively associated with 
competence (ability), followers who are aware of this relationship 
might prefer a confident manager to a more competent but 
unconfident manager. The reason is that a confident manager is more 
effective in motivating a large fraction of followers who, incorrectly, 
associate confidence with ability. For the result to hold, two 
conditions have to be met. First, there should be a sufficient number 
of followers who associate confidence with ability. Second, 
managerial input should be highly substitutable with the followers’ 
input. 
Next, the article analyzes the effect of manager’s concern for 
social image (status) on seeking feedback and reversing a failed 
business initiative when reversing results in loosing face. The 
analysis shows that the loss in social image (status), following 
reversing, is non-monotonic in initial image. The loss increases 
initially, reaches a maximum and then declines monotonically. As a 
result, a manager of very high or very low status incurs a lower 
image loss following reversing. Put it differently, image loss is 
mainly the problem of middle status managers. An immediate 
consequence is that managerial image concern creates inefficiency 
because managers are willing to implement inferior projects in order 
to save face. Increasing the managerial stake in the firm’s 
performance reduces the inefficiency by making the manager 
internalize the externality she imposes on the organization. 
There are various possibilities for future research. First, we 
analyze the effect of managerial confidence on followers by 
assuming two types of followers when one type is fully rational, and 
the other type is not rational. This represent an extreme situation that 
facilitates the exposition of the main mechanism. However, it will 
be more realistic to consider the cases when there are some followers 
in between these two types. That is, followers who are partially 
rational. In addition, it could be the case that some followers learn 
the ability of the manager from other types of followers whom they 
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consider to be more knowledgeable than themselves. Second, in our 
model the manager is either confident or unconfident and does not 
know her ability with certainty. A possible development is 
endogenizing the confidence of the manager by assuming that the 
manager knows her ability and chooses whether to appear confident 
or unconfident, similar to the approach of Benabou and Tirole 
(2002). 
Appendix 1 
Extensive Form of the Game 
The extensive form is presented in two parts due to the size of the 
extensive form. Figure 3 shows the subgame regarding experts and 
non-experts. Recall that non-experts have distorted beliefs. It is 
reflected in Figure 3 by defining the possible worlds with (𝛿, 𝜔). δ 
is the fraction of followers who are non-expert and ω is the fraction 
of managers who are high ability. Three possible worlds are 
highlighted. The world (1,1) entails that all followers are non-expert 
and all managers are high ability. The world (1,1) after the choice C 
by Nature reflects that non-experts believe that all followers are non-
experts and a confident manager is always high ability. The objective 
function (6) reflects the sequential rationality requirement regarding 
this continuation game. The world (1,0) entails that all followers are 
non-expert and all managers are low ability. The world (1,0) after 
the choice U by Nature reflects that non-experts believe that all 
followers are non-experts and an unconfident manager is always low 
ability. The world (𝛾, 𝜎) corresponds to the real world, i.e., a fraction 
γ of the followers is expert (and therefore a fraction (1 − 𝛾) is non-
expert) and a fraction σ of the managers is high quality (and therefore 
a fraction (1 − 𝜎) is low quality). 
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Figure 3: The subgame regarding the experts (above) and non-experts (below) 
Experts do not have distorted beliefs and so, their worldview 
corresponds to the real world. In other words, their belief regarding 
(δ,ω) is (γ,σ) with probability 1. This belief can be reflected in the 
extensive form in a way similar to figure 3. However, it is not 
presented in order to keep the extensive form as simple as possible.  
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Specification of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
Consider non-experts. Their strategy consists of choosing the effort 
level 𝑒𝑁  given the manager’s confidence. To choose the effort level, 
they need to form a belief about the expected value of the return. 
Their belief regarding the expected value of the return depends on 
the manager being confident or unconfident. In case the manager is 
confident, then they assume the manager is high ability. Therefore, 
the expected value of the project is given by 
𝛽𝐸(𝑅 |𝑅 ≥ 𝑟) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐸(𝑅 |𝑅 < 𝑟) 
when the manager is confident. In case the manager is unconfident, 
non-experts assume the manager has low ability and therefore the 
expected return is 𝐸(𝑅 | 𝑅 < 𝑟). 
Next, consider the experts. They make three decisions. The first 
decision is whether to investigate or not (a binary decision), given 
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 and the manager’s confidence. To make the decision, they form 
a belief about the possibility that the return is less than 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛. If the 
manager is confident, then this belief is given by 
 
 
where 𝜑𝐶  is the probability that a confident manager is high ability. 
It is defined in (4). The terms in the curly brackets represent the 
probability that a confident manager chooses a bad project. The last 
term is the probability that a bad project yields less than 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛. If the 
manager is unconfident, then this belief is given by 
 
 
where 𝜑𝑈  is the probability that an unconfident manager is high 
ability. It is defined in (5). The only difference between these two 
beliefs is that 𝜑𝐶  is replaced with 𝜑𝑈  when the manager is 
unconfident. 
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The second decision of the experts involves whether to 
communicate or not (a binary decision), given the manager’s 
confidence, 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛  and their investigation decision. Their belief 
regarding the project return depends on whether they have 
investigated or not. If they have investigated the project, then they 
know the true return with certainty. Otherwise, if they did not 
investigate, then their belief is identical to what it was in the previous 
decision node. 
Finally, the experts’ last decision involves choosing their effort 
level eE given the manager’s confidence, 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛, their investigation 
decision, their communication decision and the manager’s decision 
regarding proceeding or not. To choose their effort level, the experts 
need to form a belief about the expected return of the project. If the 
manager has not proceeded, then the experts know that the return is 
r with certainty. That is, P(R =r | did not proceed)=1. Otherwise, if 
the manager has proceeded and the experts have investigated, then 
they know the true return with certainty. Finally, if the manager has 
proceeded and the experts have not investigated, then their belief 
depends on the manager’s confidence. The experts’ belief is given 
𝜑𝑘𝛽𝐸(𝑅 |𝑅 ≥ 𝑟) + (1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝛽)𝐸(𝑅 |𝑅 < 𝑟), 𝑘 ∈ {𝐶, 𝑈} 
Consider the manager. The manager chooses the value of 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 given 
her confidence. To make the decision, she forms a belief regarding 
the possibility that the return is less than 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 (R <𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) and the 
return is between r and 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 (r < R < 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛). The first belief P(R < 
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) is identical to the belief of experts when they decide to 
investigate or not. The second belief is given by 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 1 
To simplify the notation, we drop the superscript when referring to 
the return from the experts’ perspective. That is, we write R instead 
of RE. Consider the value of production function when the 
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manager is unconfident 𝑣(𝑒𝑁 , 𝑒𝐸, 𝑅𝑈) = [(𝛾𝑒𝑁 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑒𝐸)
𝑣 + 𝑅𝑈
𝑣 ]
1
𝑣. 
Define ∆R = RU − RC. We need to show that for any fixed 𝑒𝐸
∗ , we 
have 
 
                                           (19) 
when R = RU. Differentiating v(𝑒𝑁
∗ , 𝑒𝐸
∗ ,𝑅𝑈) according to 𝑅𝑈  and eN 
and plugging in the above inequality yields 
 
Where 𝑎 = (𝛾𝑒𝑁
∗ + (1 − 𝛾)𝑒𝐸
∗ ) is a constant. Next, note that 
 
                ,evaluated at RU                                           (20)  
We know that 𝑒𝑁
∗  is the solution to 
 
Therefore, taking the derivative with respect to R and plugging into 
(20) we have 
 
Finally, we can return to (19) and plug in. It results in 
                                                  (21) 
Note that RC and RU are functions of 𝜑𝐶  and 𝜑𝑈, respectively. In 
addition, 𝜑𝑘, k ∈ {U,C} is a function of 𝛼𝐻  and 𝛼𝐿. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5  
The loss function is given by 
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which is equal to 
                                                                      (22) 
The loss function becomes 0 when 𝜌𝐻 = 0 and when 𝜌𝐻 = 1. 
Taking the derivative from (22) yields 
 
The numerator is a quadratic function that is positive when 𝜌𝐻 = 0  and 
negative when 𝜌𝐻 = 1, so it should pass zero only once. Therefore, the 
loss function (22) has one maximum between 0 and 1. The sign of the 
cross derivatives can be verified from taking the derivatives of (22). 
Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Lemma 1 
The existence of a threshold for 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛
∗  follows from (11) because there 
exists a value for 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 such that the right hand side becomes smaller 
than any positive number on the left hand side. Q.E.D.  
Proof of Lemma 2 
Assume otherwise and consider the case when the return is between 
the minimum acceptable return and the risk free return. If followers 
send the true value, then the manager implements the project. If 
followers claim that the return is less than the minimum return, then 
the manager might not implement the project. Therefore, revealing 
the true return is a weakly dominated strategy. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
The first part regarding the managerial stake follows directly from 
(14). The second part follows from the fact that the loss function 
𝐿(𝜌𝐻 , 𝐶𝐿) is non-monotonic in 𝜌𝐻  and increasing before it’s 
maximum according to Proposition 5. Therefore, denote the value of 
𝜌𝐻  that maximizes 𝐿(𝜌𝐻 , 𝐶𝐿) by 𝜌𝐻
∗
 and note that for all values of 
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𝜌𝐻 < 𝜌𝐻
∗  the loss function is increasing and so is the second term of 
(14). Q.E.D. 
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Chapter 4: Three Vignettes Regarding Documentation 
This paper studies documentations as a medium of inter-temporal 
communication in organizations. A document is a piece of information, 
received from the past, whose content might not be verifiable, but its 
existence is verifiable. We establish three results. First, documentation 
improves noisy communication between a principal and an agent whose 
interest is not fully aligned with the principal by enforcing consistency. The 
improvement, however, is constrained by the magnitude of the conflict of 
interests. Documentation might even backfire when the interests of the 
principal and agent are too divergent. Second, documents serve as a 
certificate for parties to an agreement and this in turn decreases the likelihood 
of a breach by these parties. Third, documentation serves as a time saving 
tool that improves performance especially in stable environments with 
numerous short tasks. 
Keywords: Decision making, cheap talk, information asymmetry 
 
1. Introduction 
A considerable amount of organizational resources is dedicated to 
documentation. Creating, maintaining and retrieving documents require a 
remarkable time and resources. In the US health care, administrative costs 
account for more than 25 percent of hospitals’ expenditures (Himmelstein et 
al. 2014). Despite the ubiquity of documents, there is not yet a systematic 
analysis of the role and effects of documentation on the performance of 
organizations. This paper analyzes documentation and provides a rationale 
for the widespread practice of creation and maintenance of various types of 
documents. We show how documentation affects communication and 
decision making in organizations. 
A document is a record containing information that is received from the 
past. Regardless of whether the information is truthful or not, documentation 
makes the very existence of the information indisputable. For example, 
consider the dossier of a dispute that has been resolved by litigation. The 
dossier contains the information upon which judgment has been made but 
does not necessarily show if the information is truthful or not. This article 
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explores how documentation affects behavior when information is not 
verifiable. Documentation is a multi-purpose, multi-dimension activity with 
consequences that are beyond the initial intuition that comes to the mind. 
This richness implies that no single model can do justice to it. This article 
analyzes documentation by introducing three models in order to shed light 
on the most important functions of documentation. We analyze 
documentation in a principal-agent setting and also in a model of single 
agency. Each model is introduced with an example that highlights the main 
intuition of the model. Three results are established. 
First and most important, documentation affects communication between 
a principal and an agent. This happens because documentation enforces 
consistency by providing the history of the past behavior of the agent. The 
history shows how the agent communicated upon receiving specific type of 
information in the past. Consistency requires that the agent communicate 
identical message upon receiving identical information. This enforced 
consistency is beneficial, i.e., improves communication if the interest of the 
agent does not diverge too much from the principal’s interest and if the agent 
is patient enough. In case the misalignment of the interests is too high, then 
documentation deteriorates communication and the so the principal avoids 
it. The analysis also shows that there is a partition of parameter space where 
documentation leads to path dependency. That is, whether documentation is 
beneficial or not depends on the initial realization of information. 
Second, the paper analyzes how a document serves as a certificate of an 
agreement between two parties. In this case, the parties compose a document 
to record their agreement. In case one of the parties breaches the agreement, 
the other party can take the document to a third party who can verify the 
breach and has some power to punish the party who breached. We 
endogenize the choice of the third party and, as a result, provide an 
explanation for the existence of various types of documents from internal 
memo to formal contracts. 
Third, documentation improves performance by serving as a time saving 
device. The positive effect of documentation depends on the stability of the 
environment and the informational structure of pieces of data that are 
documented. We define the notion of informational density of pieces of data 
and demonstrate that the likelihood of documentation increases with the 
stability and informational density of pieces of data. 
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Finally, in a principal-agent setting with information asymmetry, 
documentation can cause, or exacerbate, moral hazards. This happens 
because the principal has to strike a balance between two conflicting 
objectives. On the one hand, the principal needs to compel the agent to 
consult documents. On the other hand, the principal does not like the agent 
to waste time on documents 
when an alternative, but more promising, source of information becomes 
available. Consequently, the principal has to offer high-powered incentives 
to the agent when documentation is more extensive. 
This paper contributes to the literature of information economics by 
analyzing inter-temporal flow of information via documentation. This is the 
first paper, to the best knowledge of the author, that formalizes the 
documentation and its effects in organizations. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In the next section, we position the paper in the 
literature and identify relevant research areas. Section §3 analyzes 
documentation in a principal-agent setting with information asymmetry. 
Section, §4 analyzes how documentation helps parties to an agreement to 
protect themselves from a possible breach by the other party. In §5 the 
baseline model of documentation as a time saver is presented. In the section 
§6 we extend the analysis of the section §5 by incorporating the problem in 
a principal-agent setting. Finally, §7 concludes the paper and discusses 
future research possibilities. 
2. Related literature 
This paper studies the effect of documentation in communication. This 
connects this paper to the extensive literature on strategic information 
transmission. The seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) started the 
cheap talk literature with the main insight being that the informational 
content of communication deteriorates as the conflict of interests increases. 
It was followed by a series of papers extending it to multiple agents and 
multi-dimensional communication (Batagglini (2002); Ambrus and 
Takahashi (2008); Krishna and Morgan (2001)) and designing mechanisms 
to elicit information from informants (Wolinsky (2002); Batagglini (2004); 
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989). This paper also deals with imperfect 
communication resulting from agency bias. We differ, however, in that we 
do not analyze the effect of various types of decision rules and information 
aggregation techniques but rather on the medium of communication. 
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In organizational research, a number of papers analyze the organizational 
consequences of noisy communication. For example, Dessein (2002) 
concluded that delegation is superior to communication when the conflict is 
not too large. Alonso et al. (2008) studied the optimal degree of 
centralization in the presence of information asymmetry. Our paper is related 
to these papers as we are also concerned with strategic information 
transmission. However, this paper is different as it focuses on inter-temporal 
information transmission rather than the institutional setting through which 
information flows. 
In the analysis of documentation as certificates, we refer to contracts as an 
extreme form of certificates. Our theoretical reasoning overlaps considerably 
with incomplete contracting literature a la Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
Hart and Moore (1990). However, we do not analyze the consequences of 
contract incompleteness for asset ownership and incentives for investment 
that are the focus of property rights models. 
Our analysis of documentation as a time saving device rests on the 
assumption that people have limited memory, as emphasized by Simon 
(1950). Simon was also among the first to notice the importance of 
organizational memory. Simon (1991) highlights the role automated expert 
systems in operationalizing organizational memory by saying” One motive 
for such automation, but certainly not the only one, is that it makes 
organizational memory less vulnerable to personnel turnover.” Later 
developments of the topic especially in organizational theory defined 
organizational memory in a broad sense consisting of not only information 
acquiring and retrieval but also the structure of information retention such as 
culture, individuals and information systems (Walsh and Ungson (1991); 
Stein and Zwass (1995)). This line of research laid the foundation of a 
flourishing line of research in organizational learning (Levitt and March 
(1988); Huber (1991)) and knowledge management studied, among others, 
by Nonaka (1994) and Grant (1996). Our paper is much narrower in scope 
and a focus on documentation rather than the entire business of information 
management. 
Finally, the paper is also related to the classic problem of moral hazards 
resulting from imperfect information (Holmstrom¨ (1979); Shavell (1979); 
Harris and Raviv (1979))1. The focus of these papers is on designing optimal 
compensation package. We also deal with designing compensation package 
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but the main concern, in this paper, is the relationship between 
documentation and compensation package and not the latter in isolation.  
3. Documentation as a Means of Enforcing Consistency 
Managers are responsible for making decisions in organizations. In doing 
so, they rely on information provided by others including their subordinates 
and peers. The quality of the decisions depends, to a large extent, on the 
quality of information provided by the informants. If informants have private 
information, they might not be willing to truthfully inform the manager if 
they know that doing so results in the manager making decision(s) they do 
not like. It happens when the interests of the informant(s) and the manager 
(decision maker) are not fully aligned, i.e., informants are biased. When this 
is the case, informants tend to provide information strategically to affect the 
decision(s) of the manager. Strategic transmission of information is a well-
known problem (Crawford and Sobel 1982) with remarkable consequences 
for organizational structure (Alonso et al. 2008). We show that 
documentation can improve decision making when the informants have 
private information and the interests of the informants and the decision 
maker are not fully aliened. The following example highlights the intuition 
behind our analysis. 
An economic department is hiring new assistant professors. Assessment 
of candidates is done by the head of the department, but the ultimate hiring 
decision rests with the dean of the school. The head of the department is a 
microeconomist and thus tends to favor applicants that specialize in 
microeconomics to applicants with other specializations like 
macroeconomics, econometrics. The dean of the school is unable to assess 
the candidates herself and has to rely on the assessments made by the head 
of the department. In addition, the dean is aware of the tendency of the 
department’s head and intends to design a hiring process to minimize the 
effect of this tendency. Can documentation serve as a countervailing tool 
against the tendency of the department’s head? In other words, is it possible 
for the dean to improve the hiring process by asking the department’s head 
to document the assessment process? Intuitively, documentation does not 
solve the core problem of the dean, the information asymmetry. 
Documentation does not enable the dean to verify the assessment since the 
knowledge of how to interpret the credentials of candidates remains soft. 
There is, however, a point in documentation. Documenting the evaluation 
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procedure enforces consistency and this in turn might affect the behavior of 
the department’s head. 
Suppose that in each period one candidate arrives and is evaluated. There 
are two types of candidates. Candidates who specialize in microeconomics 
and candidates who specialize in macroeconomics. Each candidate is either 
high or low in terms of the research merits. The dean asks the department’s 
head to evaluate each candidate and then nominate the candidate only if the 
candidate is a high type. The department’s head is in favor of micro 
candidates since he is a micro economist himself. This implies that the head 
tends to be lenient in evaluating micro candidates and impartial in evaluating 
macro candidates. The dean knows that there are micro and macro candidates 
and the department’ head’s tendency. However, the dean does not observe 
whether a candidate is high or low. Absent documentation, the head 
recommends a macro candidate only if the candidate has a high research 
merit. The head also recommends some micro candidates that do not have a 
high research merit. The dean hires all recommended candidates despite 
knowing that the head recommends some low candidates. 
 
Next, what happens if the dean asks the head to document the evaluation 
process? To answer this question, suppose that candidates have a profile (W) 
that includes their publications’ record. For example, (W) shows the journals 
where candidates published. Importantly, (W) is verifiable in the sense that 
the dean can verify whether a candidate has actually published in a journal 
or not. However, the dean does not know how to interpret or evaluate the 
value of publications. This is the private information of the head. The effect 
of documentation depends critically on the characteristics of type micro and 
macro candidates. To show this, assume that there are two categories of 
journals: top journals and field journals. In addition, there are two types of 
field journals: high quality field journals and low-quality field journals. Both 
the dean and the head know that high ability candidates publish in either the 
top or high-quality field journals, whereas low ability candidates publish 
only in low quality field journals. In addition, both the dean and the head 
know top journals, but only the head can distinguish high quality field 
journals from the low quality ones. The dean would like the head to nominate 
a candidate only if the candidate published either in the top or a high-quality 
field journal. The head, however, likes to hire some micro candidates even 
if they have published in a low-quality field journal.  To see whether 
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documentation helps the dean to mitigate the effect of the head’s tendency, 
we need to distinguish two possible cases. 
First, the case when there are low quality field journals that publish 
exclusively micro or macro papers but not both. Documentation does not 
help in this situation because the head can select a group of low-quality field 
journals that exclusively publish micro papers and designate them as high 
quality field journals. There is no possibility for the dean to uncover the truth 
since the head does it in a consistent way. That is, the head nominates a 
candidate if the candidate has published either in a top journal or a high-
quality field journal, regardless of specialty. The head also nominates a 
micro candidate if the candidate has published in low quality field journals 
that he designated as high quality. The dean observes that all candidates who 
published in some journals (including low quality micro field journals, 
unbeknownst to her) are nominated. Therefore, there is no way for the dean 
to constrain the head by documentation. 
Next, consider the case when there is no low quality field journal that 
exclusively publishes micro or macro papers. If the head designates a low 
quality field journal as a high quality journal, then he has to also nominate 
macro candidates who published in that journal. The head cannot nominate 
some candidates who published in a journal but reject other candidates who 
published in the same journal since the dean observes the inconsistency. 
Documentation seems to play a role here. Note, however, that the head might 
decide to recommend all candidates who published in the mis-specified field 
journal if the proportion of micro candidates who publish in that journal is 
much higher than the proportion of macro candidates who publish there. 
Therefore, the force of consistency improves the process only if micro 
candidates share an important characteristic with macro candidates and the 
head’s interests is aligned with the principal’s interests at least for macro 
candidates. Otherwise documentation might actually do more harm than 
good. 
Finally, note that for the documentation to have any effect, more than one 
period is needed. This is because the only punishment available to the dean, 
is refusing to hire a nominated candidate and for this to have an effect, the 
head should care sufficiently about the future. 
This simple example highlights the main intuition: documentation 
enforces consistency. For this consistency to improve communication two 
conditions have to be satisfied. First, the agent’s interest should not diverge 
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too much from the principal’s interest (in the example, the head would like 
macro candidates to be assessed impartially). Second, the preferred and non-
preferred groups should share one or more characteristics. Otherwise, the 
composer of the document (head) manipulates the evaluation of the preferred 
group and makes an impartial assessment of the non-preferred group in a 
consistent way. 
3.1. The Model 
Players: An agent (he) who is in charge of evaluating candidates. A principal 
(she) who makes the final approval decision. There are two types of 
candidates {𝑡1, 𝑡2} and each type can be either high H or low L in terms of 
ability. Henceforth, we call them high and low for brevity. The proportions 
of type 𝑡1 and type 𝑡2 in the society are p1 and p2, respectively. A fraction 𝜎𝑖  
of type 𝑡𝑖, i ∈{1,2} candidates are low and the rest are high. Each candidate, 
regardless of its type, has a profile 𝛾 ⊆ {𝑎1, 𝑎2} representing its 
characteristics. 
Actions: The principal decides whether to have documentation or not. If yes, 
then in each period, the agent sends the recommendation along with the 
candidate’s profile to the principal. The recommendation of the agent takes 
the form of a Y or N denoting a positive and negative opinion, respectively. 
The principal makes the final approval decision, payoffs are realized and the 
period ends. In case the principal decides not to document, the agent 
evaluates a candidate and sends the recommendation to the principal. The 
principal approves or rejects the candidate. Payoffs are realized and the 
period ends. 
Payoffs: The principal gets a utility of 1 from approving a high candidate 
regardless of its type. Approving a low candidate results in getting a 
(dis)utility of -1. The agent has an identical preference when the candidate is 
𝑡2 but is in favor of type t1 candidates. That is, the agent receives a utility of 
1 when a type 𝑡1 candidate is approved, regardless of being high or low. 
Information structure: The agent observes candidates’ types and 
whether they are high or low. The principal is aware that there are two types 
of candidates and that each type might be high or low. However, the principal 
does not observe the types and whether candidates are high or low. These are 
the private information of the agent. The principal observes the profiles of 
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candidates and knows 𝜎𝑖  and 𝑝𝑖. The principal also knows that the agent is 
favor of one of the types. 
The solution concept is subgame Perfect Equilibrium and we analyze only 
Pure strategy equilibria. Mixed strategies are less intuitive and less suitable 
for our analysis. 
3.1.1. Decision Making without Documentation 
Suppose the principal decides not to document. Consider the following 
strategies for the agent and the principal. The agent recommends only high 
candidates and the principal approves the recommended candidates. 
Obviously, this cannot an equilibrium strategy as the agent has an incentive 
to deviate and recommend low candidates of his favorite type. Next, consider 
the following pair of strategies. The agent recommends a candidate when the 
candidate is his favorite type. When the candidate is not his favorite type, he 
recommends the candidate only if the candidate is high. The principal 
approves all recommended candidates. We analyze if this be supported in 
equilibrium. Obviously, a negative recommendation results in rejecting the 
candidate as it indicates a low candidate that is not the agent favorite type. 
When the recommendation is positive the principal should approve the 
candidate only if 
𝑃(𝐻 |𝑌 ) − 𝑃(𝐿 |𝑌 ) > 0. 
Otherwise she is better off not approving a recommended candidate. Since 
𝑃(𝐿|𝑌 ) = 1 − 𝑃(𝐻 | 𝑌 ) > 0, the above condition boils down to 
𝑃(𝐻 | 𝑌 ) > 1/2. The probability 𝑃(𝐻|𝑌 ) can be derived in a 
straightforward way by conditioning on the nominee’s type 
                 𝑃(𝐻 |𝑌 ) = 𝑃(𝐻 | 𝑌, 𝑡1)𝑃(𝑡1) + 𝑃(𝐻|𝑌, 𝑡2)𝑃(𝑡2)                   (1) 
The agent never recommends a type t2 candidate unless she is high, so P(H | 
Y, 𝑡2) = 1. For 𝑡1 candidates, the agent always recommends them regardless 
of being high or low, i.e., P(H | Y,𝑡1) = P(H | 𝑡1). Therefore, the probability 
that a candidate of type t1 is high given that she is recommended by the agent 
equals the probability that a random t1 candidate is high. We can then restate 
(1) as 
 𝑃(𝐻 | 𝑌 ) = (1 − 𝜎1)𝑝1  + 𝑝2. (2) 
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If the majority of candidates are type t2, i.e., p2 ≥ 1/2, then the principal 
should approve all candidates recommended by the agent knowing that some 
low candidates will also be approved. If the majority of candidates are t1 type 
and most t1 candidates are low, then it is likely that 𝑃(𝐻 | 𝑌 ) < 1/2 and no 
candidate should be approved. Recall that the principal knows 𝑝𝑖  and 𝜎𝑖. 
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of the principal entails approving all 
candidates that are recommended, when 𝑃(𝐻 | 𝑌 )  ≥  1/2. If 𝑃(𝐻 | 𝑌 )  <
 1/2, then the principal should reject all recommended candidates. When this 
the case, the agent is indifferent between recommending and not 
recommending any candidate. 
PROPOSITION 1. Absent documentation, the equilibrium strategies 
depend on whether (1 − 𝜎1)𝑝1 + 𝑝2  ≥  1/2 or not. If it holds, then the agent 
recommends all favorite candidates. The agent recommends non-favorite 
candidates only if they have a high merit. The principal approves only 
recommended candidates. If (1 − 𝜎1)𝑝1 + 𝑝2 <  1/2, then the principal 
does not approve any candidate and the agent is indifferent between 
recommending and not recommending candidates. 
Note that in case the principal approves all recommended candidates, the 
probability that a hired candidate is high is given by (2). When this is the 
case, type t1 candidates are systematically preferred to type t2 candidates. 
3.1.2. Decision Making with Documentation 
Recall that each candidate has a profile γ showing characteristics such as 
publication, degrees, and so on. Critically, these characteristics are 
observable by the principal. However, the knowledge of interpreting these 
characteristics is the private information of the agent. That is, the principal 
can verify the profiles but cannot interpret them. It is the agent who knows 
how each element in the profile should be interpreted. To start, assume that 
the profile of candidates can have two elements, {𝑎1, 𝑎2}. That is, a 
candidate’s profile can include either 𝑎1 or 𝑎2 or both. For simplicity, assume 
that high candidates all have 𝑎2 in their profile, regardless of being 𝑡1 or 𝑡2, 
i.e., their profile contains only 𝑎2 or both 𝑎1 and 𝑎2. Low candidates, on the 
other hand, have only 𝑎1 in their profile. Note, however, that this is the 
private information of the agent. The principal does not know that such a 
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relationship between profile and ability exist. Documentation enables the 
principal to constrain the behavior of the agent. This happens because once 
the agent recommends (rejects) a candidate with a specific profile, he can not 
reject (recommend) other candidates with identical profiles. Knowing this, 
the agent behaves in a way that is different from how he would have behaved, 
had there been no documentation. In this setting, the agent must decide 
whether to recommend a low candidate or not. Low candidates are marked 
by having only a1 in their profiles. The agent prefers to recommend low 
candidates only when they are type 𝑡1. With documentation, however, it is 
not possible because the principal can check that the agent recommended 
some candidates with only a1 in their profiles but rejected some others with 
identical profiles. Therefore, the agent should decide whether to recommend 
low candidates regardless of their type or not. Consider the following 
definitions. 
𝐸(𝑌| 𝛾 =  {𝑎1}): The expected payoff, of the agent, of leaving a period 
with recommending a low candidate. 
𝐸(𝑁| 𝛾 =  {𝑎1}): The expected payoff, of the agent, of leaving a period with 
rejecting a low candidate. 
these two definitions help us in analyzing the decision of the agent. 
Suppose the candidate is low, 
we need to distinguish the case when the candidate is of type 𝑡1 from the case 
when the candidate is 𝑡2 type. Suppose the candidate is 𝑡1 type. The expected 
payoff of the agent depending on his 
decision is; 
1 + 𝛿𝐸(𝑌| 𝛾 = {𝑎1}) if the candidate is recommended 
0+𝛿𝐸(𝑁|𝛾 = {𝑎1})   if the candidate is not recommended 
where δ is the discount rate. When the candidate is t2 type, then the expected 
payoff is given by 
                   −1 + 𝛿𝐸(𝑌|𝛾 = {𝑎1}) if the candidate is recommended 
                   0 + 𝛿𝐸(𝑁| 𝛾 = {𝑎1})  if the candidate is not recommended 
To derive 𝐸(𝑁|𝛾 = {𝑎1}), note that rejecting a low candidate in one period 
means that the agent cannot recommend low candidates in the future. As a 
result, the agent receives a unit of utility in each period if the candidate is 
competent and zero otherwise. 
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            𝐸(𝑌|𝛾 = {𝑎1}) = ∑ 𝛿𝑡∞𝑡=1 (1 − 𝑞)                                     (3) 
where q is the probability of receiving a low candidate given by 
𝐸(𝑌|𝛾 = {𝑎1}) = ∑ 𝛿𝑡∞𝑡=1 (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑞 = 𝜎1𝑝1  + 𝜎2𝑝2 
To derive 𝐸(𝑌| 𝛾 = {𝑎1}), note that if the agent recommends a low 
candidate in one period, he cannot reject low candidates in the future periods. 
As a result, leaving a period with recommending a low candidate implies that 
the agent has to recommend all low candidates in the future. We have 
𝐸(𝑌|𝛾 = {𝑎1}) = 𝛿{𝜎1𝑝1(1 + 𝐸(𝑌)) + 𝜎2𝑝2(−1 + 𝐸(𝑌)) + (1 − 𝑞)(1 + 𝐸(𝑌))} 
     To simplify the notation, we write 𝐸(𝑌| 𝛾 =  {𝑎1}) and 𝐸(𝑁| 𝛾 =
 {𝑎1}) as E(Y) and E(N), respectively. The above equation gives the 
expression for E(Y) as 
                                                                 (4) 
Given 𝐸(𝑌) and 𝐸(𝑁), we are ready to analyze the decision of the agent. 
Note that there are three possibilities. First, the agent rejects the first low 
candidate even when the candidate is his favorite 
𝑡1 type. It happens when 1 + 𝛿𝐸(𝑌) < 𝛿𝐸(𝑁). Given (3) and (4), it implies 
that 
                                                  (5) 
Second, in contrast to the first case, the agent recommends the first low 
candidate even when the candidate is not his favorite type. It happens when 
−1 + 𝛿𝐸(𝑌) > 𝛿𝐸(𝑁). This case implies 
 
                                                                                (6) 
Finally, it can also happen that 
−1 + 𝛿𝐸(𝑌) < 𝛿𝐸(𝑁) < 1 + 𝛿𝐸(𝑌 ) 
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This case refers to the situation when the agent rejects the first low candidate 
only if the candidate is not his favorite type and recommends it if the 
candidate is his favorite type. In other words, this case leads to path 
dependence. It happens when 
 
                                        (7) 
When this happens, the outcome of documentation depends on whether the 
first low candidate is a favorite type or not. In case the agent cares 
sufficiently about the future, 𝛿 ≈ 1, then (7) happens when the fraction of 
favorite low candidates is close to the fraction of low candidates that are not 
favorite type. This indicates that we can identify areas or zones for 𝑝2𝜎2  −
 𝑝1𝜎1 that determine whether documentation is beneficial, backfires or leads 
to path dependence. 
Assume, without loss of generality, that the fraction of low candidates q 
is fixed. We can rewrite (5), the area where documentation is beneficial, as 
                                                 (8) 
This reflects our intuition in the example of the beginning of this section. For 
documentation to be beneficial, it should not heavily target the agent’s 
favorite type. Doing the same transformation for (6) and (7), we can show 
that when 
                            (9) 
path dependence emerges. Finally, when the agent’s favorite candidates are 
heavily targeted by documentation, 
                                           
then documentation backfires as the agent recommends all low candidates. 
Figure 1 depicts the areas (zones) where documentation is beneficial, 
detrimental and leads to path dependence. 
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PROPOSITION 2. With documentation, the equilibrium strategy of the   
agent entails either 
• Recommending all low candidates (detrimental zone). 
• Not recommending any low candidate (beneficial zone). 
• Recommending all low candidates if the first low candidate is a 
favorite type and not recommending any low candidate otherwise. 
As Figure (1) shows, an increase in δ results in the shrinkage of the path 
dependence zone and expansion of beneficial and detrimental zones. 
Intuitively, as the agent becomes more patient, the weight of the 
consumption in the first period, when an incompetent candidate is received 
for the first time, diminishes. Conversely, when the agent is not patient 
enough, the consumption in the first period becomes pivotal in his decision. 
In other words, short termism induces path dependence. The parameter δ can 
also be interpreted as the probability that the agent continuous working in 
the next period. Therefore, an agent who is uncertain whether she will be 
doing the same job in the future or not, is more likely to exhibit myopic 
behavior. 
Next, from Figure 1 we see that an increase in p1σ1 makes documentation 
less beneficial for the principal. This reflects our intuition that documentation 
cannot be beneficial for the principal if it works heavily against the agent. A 
high value of p1σ1 together with a fixed q implies that most low candidates 
are the agent’s favorite type and, therefore, the agent is willing to recommend 
all low types knowing that most of them will be his favorite type. 
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Figure 1: Documentation strategy of the agent 
     Recall that the principal receives a utility of -1 from hiring a low candidate 
whereas the agent receives a utility of -1 only if the low candidate is not his 
favorite type. Otherwise, if the candidate is his favorite type, the agent 
receives a utility of 1 of approving the low candidate. We can generalize the 
analysis by assuming that the agent receives a utility of −1× 𝛼 of hiring a low 
candidate of his favorite type. The parameter 𝛼 ≤ 1 represents the conflict of 
interests. In our analysis so far α was assumed to be -1, but it can be any 
number less than one. It is straightforward to show that having α instead of -
1 changes the upper bound of 𝑝1𝜎1 from 
1
2
(𝑞 +
1− 𝛿
𝛿
) to 
1
1−𝛼
(𝑞 +
1− 𝛿
𝛿
) and 
the lower bound from 
1
2
(𝑞 −
1− 𝛿
𝛿
) to 
1
1−𝛼
(𝑞 −
1− 𝛿
𝛿
). Therefore, we can draw 
the corresponding zones for different values of α and δ as in 2. As we can 
see, when the interests diverge too much, 𝛼 <<0, then the beneficial zone 
shrinks substantially while the detrimental zones grows.              
COROLLARY 1. The beneficial (detrimental) zone shrinks (expands) with 
the magnitude of the conflict of interests. 
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  Given the behavior of the agent with documentation, the principal should 
decide whether to ask for documentation or not. When documentation is 
beneficial the optimal decision of the principal is clear, she should ask for 
documentation. When documentation is detrimental, the principal is better 
off without documentation as it results in approving all low candidates 
whereas in the absence of documentation only one type of low candidates is 
approved. The case when documentation results in path dependency is more 
subtle. If the first low candidate is a favorite type, then the agent recommends 
it and so documentation will do more harm than good. But if 
 
Figure 2: Documentation zones. 
the first low candidate is not a favorite type, then the agent rejects it and 
documentation becomes beneficial. The expected benefit of documentation, 
when it leads to path dependency is 
 
The first term in the above equation refers to the case when the first low 
candidate is a favorite type. In this case, the principal receives -1 for that 
period plus the expected payoff when all candidates are approved (1 − q − q) 
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in the future. The second term refers to the case when the first low candidate 
is not a favorite type. Absent documentation, the principal receives an 
expected payoff of 
1
1−𝛿
(1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2𝜎2) if she approves all recommended 
candidates and 0 otherwise. As a result, the principal is better off with 
documentation if 
 
     (10) 
The following Lemma states the result. 
LEMMA 1. There exist an upper bound on p1σ1 such that (10) is satisfied 
if p1σ1 is equal or lower than the upper bound. 
Lemma 1 is intuitive. If p1σ1 is low, then path dependency is more likely to 
make documentation beneficial as the first low candidate is more likely to be 
a non-favorite type. Denote the upper bound in Lemma 1 by 𝑝1
∗𝑝2
∗. We can 
state the equilibrium documentation decision. 
PROPOSITION 3. The equilibrium documentation decision of the  
principal entails: 
• When 𝑝1𝑝2 ≤ 𝑝1
∗𝑝2
∗, then documentation is optimal. 
• When 𝑝1𝑝2 > 𝑝1
∗𝑝2
∗, then documentation is optimal only if the 
equilibrium strategy of the agent is not recommending any low candidate 
(beneficial zone). 
Note that our interpretation of the case when documentation plays a 
detrimental role is based solely on the outcome of decisions, hiring high 
ability candidates in our case. However, if we incorporate other criteria, then 
the interpretation might change. For example, suppose that the principal 
cares also about procedural fairness. That is, the principal would like all 
candidates to be treated equally. In this case, documentation might be 
valuable even when it deteriorates the quality of approved candidates. 
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4. Document as a Certificate 
When a citizen makes a promise to another citizen, she can make it either 
verbal or record (document) it. If the promise is merely verbal, only the 
individuals involved observe the promise. Therefore, in case a person does 
not fulfill the promise, the consequence is that the other party is aggrieved. 
The most severe punishment available to the aggrieved party, in a civilized 
society, is refusing to interact with the person who did not fulfill the promise. 
This serves as a punishment only if they are supposed to interact in the future. 
If the promise is documented, however, there are more people who observe, 
or can potentially observe, the promise. As a result, in case the promise is 
not delivered, the consequences are worse for the person who made the 
promise. Therefore, documentation serves as a tool that provides incentive 
to people to honor their promises. In other words, documentation brings 
additional parties into a dyadic relationship and this in turn might increase 
the pressure on parties to honor their promises. For documentation to have 
such an effect, it has to satisfy two requirements. First of all, the document 
should enable a third party to verify a breach. If a third party cannot verify 
whether a party has breached her promise or not, as stated in the document, 
then documentation does not achieve its purpose. Secondly, the third party 
should have some sort of leverage to punish a party once the breach is 
verified. In other words, the third party should be able to enforce the promise. 
These two properties are, however, in tension. The tension can be explained 
as follows. Consider two interacting parties and assume that they stand at 
one end of a line segment. The distance along the line segment from the 
position of parties indicates the hierarchical or formal distance from the 
transacting parties. The transacting parties are at the same hierarchy. These 
parties are able to fully verify a breach in case it happens. However, being at 
the same hierarchy, each party is unable to hold the other party accountable 
in case the former breaches a promise. The other end point of the line 
segment represents the courts. Parties can write a formal document, a 
contract, that is fully enforceable by the court. This increased enforceability, 
however, comes at the cost of a lower verifiability. A judge is much less 
likely to be able to verify a breach. Courts are able to verify broad terms and 
not relationship-specific details. In between the two extremes, other 
institutions lie that are able to verify and enforce the promise with various 
degrees of compromise between enforceability and verifiability. 
To show the idea more formally, define an agreement between two parties 
A and B as a set consisting of promises. That is, an agreement is represented 
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by a 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑆 ≡ {𝑠1, 𝑠2, . . 𝑠𝑁} where each member 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, . . , 𝑁} represents a 
promise from party A to party B. As an example, suppose John and Ann 
make an agreement for painting Ann’s house at a certain price. Their 
agreement entails four elements. First, John should paint the house 
completely (𝑠1). Second, the painting should be completed before a certain 
date (𝑠2). Third, John should use high quality materials (𝑠3) and finally, John 
should deliver a specific drawing for one of the bedrooms which Ann 
explained to him in detail (𝑠4). 
Next, denote the distance of a third party from the transacting parties by d 
∈ [0,1]. By distance we mean the hierarchical distance such that the degree 
of authority increases as the third party becomes more distant. The 
transacting parties are at distance zero d=0 whereas distance one d=1 
represents the court. Next, define the subset 𝐼(𝑑) ⊆ 𝑆 as the set of verifiable 
elements at distance d ∈ [0,1]. The set I(d) is such 𝐼(𝑑1) ⊆ 𝐼(𝑑1) ⇐⇒ 𝑑1 >
𝑑2 for all d ∈ [0,1]. Intuitively, the set I(d) shows which elements of S are 
verifiable for a third party at distance d from the transacting parties. The 
property 𝐼(𝑑1) ⊆ 𝐼(𝑑2) ⇐⇒ 𝑑1 > 𝑑2 implies that the number of verifiable 
elements decreases with the distance. In our example of John and Ann, the 
third party can be either a neighbor 𝑑1 or another professional painter 𝑑2 or 
the court 𝑑3. The neighbor knows Ann and her house well enough to verify 
all four elements of the agreement. That is, 𝐼(𝑑1) = 𝑆. The professional 
painter is able to verify all elements but the special drawing s4 which requires 
knowing Ann personally and her taste, i.e., 𝐼(𝑑2) = 𝑆/𝑠4. Finally, a judge is 
able to verify only if the painting is done completely and on time, but cannot 
verify the quality of the material and the special drawing. It implies 𝐼(𝑑3) =
𝑆/{𝑠3, 𝑠4}. Therefore, we have 𝑑1 < 𝑑2 < 𝑑3 and 𝐼(𝑑3) ⊂ 𝐼(𝑑2) ⊂ 𝐼(𝑑1).  
The agreement set S can now be ordered by defining a relation on it. For any 
pair 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝑠𝑗 if 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝐼(𝑑), then 𝑠𝑖 ∈  𝐼(𝑑) for all d ∈ [0,1]. In other words, 
the ordered set S is such that if element 𝑠𝑗 is verifiable at distance d, then all 
elements 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗 are also verifiable at that distance. 
Next, define another set W whose elements 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈  {1,2. . 𝑁} show the 
value of corresponding promises in the ordered set S. That is, there is a 
bijection 𝑓 ∶ 𝑆 → 𝑊. Given the sets S and W, we can calculate the value of 
an agreement at a distance d by 
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𝑔(𝑑) ≡ ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
, 𝑛 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖, 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝐼(𝑑). 
The function g(d) indicates the value of an agreement at a distance d. 
Obviously, g(0) equals the total value of an agreement while g(1) is the value 
of the agreement in the court. In our example, the agreement of John and 
Ann consists of four promises and the value of each promise 𝑠𝑖  is 𝑤𝑖, 𝑖 ∈
 {1,2,3,4} for her. The neighbor at 𝑑1 is able to verify all promises and so the 
value of the agreement in case the neighbor is the third party is w1 +w2 +w3 
+w4. If the third party is a judge, then the value of the agreement is w1 +w2. 
Obviously, as the third party becomes more distant, the value of the 
agreement decreases. That is, 𝑔(𝑑𝑖) ≤ 𝑔(𝑑𝑗) ⇐⇒  𝑑𝑗  ≤ 𝑑𝑖. 
Next, consider enforceability. It represents the probability that the third party 
enforces the value of an agreement at distance d. Denote this probability with 
f(d) to emphasize that it is also a function of the distance. We assume that 
𝑓(𝑑1) ≤ 𝑓(𝑑2) ⇐⇒  𝑑1 ≤ 𝑑2. That is, a third party who sits higher in the 
hierarchy ladder, is more likely to be able to enforce an agreement. We think 
it is a reasonable assumption and reflects the working of modern economies. 
We are now ready to analyze documentation by defining a document. A 
document is an indisputable description of an agreement where the elements 
of the agreement, the promises, are verifiable at a distance d. Indisputable 
means that the parties to the agreement cannot deny that they have consented 
to the content of the document, i.e., the existence of the agreement is not 
deniable. Being verifiable at a distance d implies that a third party, at a 
hierarchical distance d from the parties, is able to verify the fulfilment of all 
promises mentioned in the document. Documentation can be regarded as the 
decision to optimally choose the position of the third party. The position of 
the third party in turn determines the type of the document. The transacting 
parties solve the following problem 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑑 𝑔(𝑑)𝑓(𝑑) 
0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 1 
Assume, without loss of generality, that 𝑔(𝑑) and 𝑓(𝑑) are differentiable. 
The optimal solution, denoted by d∗ is given by 
                         
𝑔′(𝑑∗)
𝑔(𝑑∗)
=  
𝑓′(𝑑∗)
𝑓(𝑑∗)
                                                         (11) 
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The condition (11) therefore, implies that parties to an agreement should 
choose a third party by striking a balance between value and enforceability. 
The position of the third party then dictates the kind of document that is 
needed. An agreement whose value depends, to a considerable extent, on the 
nuances and subtleties necessitates a third party that is close to the 
transacting parties even though such a third party has limited authority to 
enforce the agreement. An agreement whose value depends mostly on coarse 
measures calls for a more distant and powerful third party such as a judge. 
The document in this case, takes the form of a formal contract. In our 
example, Ann might become worried that John does not stick to their 
agreement completely and so asks John to sign a document showing their 
agreement. In doing so, the critical decision is determining a third party that 
will serve as a referee in case Ann and John disagree on how well the 
agreement has been implemented. Of the three possible candidates, the judge 
has full power to enforce the contract. The other professional painter does 
not have full authority like a judge but can exert a pressure on John by, for 
example, threatening to damage his reputation. Finally, the neighbor is even 
less powerful than the professional painter. However, John might care about 
the neighbor if she is also considering having John painting her house. As 
we see, these third parties offer various degrees of verifiability and 
enforceability. We review three possible scenarios and show how each 
scenario requires a different type of documentation. 
    The first scenario entails that Ann cares mostly about her house being 
painted completely and on time and less about the quality and the drawing of 
the bedroom. That is, for Ann, w1 +w2 >> w3 +w4 or equivalently 
𝑔′(𝑑)
𝑔(𝑑)
 drops 
very slowly. In this case, a formal contract is the best type of document 
because a judge can fully enforce the contract and make John compensate 
her in case he does not paint the house completely or on time. The second 
scenario entails that Ann cares about the quality of the material very much. 
That is, she prefers to have her house painted a little bit later but with the 
promised quality. In this case, the ratio 
𝑔′(𝑑)
𝑔(𝑑)
 drops slowly with d when d is 
such that s3 is verifiable and fast afterwards. The best choice involves having 
another painter as the third party. The corresponding document in this case 
describes 𝑠1, 𝑠2, and 𝑠3,. Finally, the third scenario entails Ann caring a lot 
about the special drawing. Ann might be able to paint her house herself and 
buy high quality material from the market but cannot make the drawing as it 
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requires professional skills. This scenario implies that 
𝑔′(𝑑)
𝑔(𝑑)
 drops very fast 
with d early on and then slows down. Therefore, having the neighbor as the 
third party is more beneficial for Ann as the neighbor is the only potential 
third party who is able to verify the drawing. Here the document describes 
the full agreement. Note that the optimality condition (11) can also be 
represented in term of elasticity as 
                                                    
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔′(𝑑∗))
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞(𝑑∗))
= 1 (12) 
It entails that at the optimal distance 𝑑∗, the elasticity of g(d) according to 
q(d) is equal to one in absolute terms. This is another way of representing 
the optimality condition. The following Proposition summarizes this section. 
PROPOSITION 4. Optimal documentation involves selecting an optimal 
third party by the transacting parties. Selecting an optimal third party 
implies striking a balance between verifiability and enforceability. 
5. Documentation and Time Saving 
Consider electronic medical records (EMR). In most developed countries 
citizens have medical records that are accessible by health care provides. 
These medical records are updated whenever a patient visits a doctor or gets 
a new treatment at a medical center. Most EMR systems have an assessment 
component where doctors are required to write their diagnosis and the 
courses of treatments. This assessment component is discretionary, so 
doctors decide what to write and how detailed it is. How does a doctor decide 
about it? Assume a patient with a specific symptom visits her doctor. In order 
to diagnose the cause of the symptom, the doctor asks the patient to take an 
X-ray scan, a blood test and also performs physical examination. Next, the 
doctor sends the results of the scan and the blood test to specialists for 
interpretation. Finally, the physician receives all available information and 
then forms an opinion about the disease that caused the symptoms. The 
physician starts the treatment process and monitors the patient periodically. 
The physician can update the EMR of the patient during each visit by writing 
her assessment of the progress of the treatment process. She can also refuse 
to write assessment and update only the parts that are required. In deciding 
to write her assessment, the physician weighs the costs and benefits of 
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writing the assessment in the EMR. Adding the assessment to the EMR 
requires spending some time but saves time in the next visits. Writing 
periodical assessments in the EMR helps the physician to remember the 
history of the diagnosis and the process of treatment such that she does not 
have to go through the whole EMR to remember a patient’s history. This is 
due to the fact that the physician has a limited, imperfect, memory. If the 
physician had a perfect memory, then there was no need to add periodic 
assessment to the EMR. Limited memory, however, implies that the 
physician forgets the details about her patients unless she writes it in the 
EMR. Limited memory is a key contributing factor for documentation. 
However, limited memory matters only when time is valuable. If the 
physician has plenty of time, then she can read all the details of the EMR of 
a patient before each visit. Limited memory, therefore, matters in 
combination with time constraint. Next, note that despite being aware of her 
limited memory, the physician might not write all the details. For example, 
the physician might write the full details of the X-ray scan but briefly 
mention the results of the physical examinations, if at all, because she feels 
that the patient’s state is not stable and the same examinations might provide 
different results if repeated shortly afterwards. Documenting unstable details 
is a waste of time unless one is interested in the trend or the dynamism of a 
variable/phenomenon. Stability, therefore, is another key factor in 
documentation. This example highlights our intuition about documentation. 
It involves saving a resource, time, for the future by refusing to consume it 
in the presents. The value of the saving, however, depreciates if the 
environment is not stable. 
5.1. The Model 
An individual must make a decision a in two consecutive periods. To make 
the decision, the individual needs to gather information about the relevant 
parameters that affect the decision. For simplicity, assume that the decision 
should match the state of the world w, in each period, to yield the desired 
outcome that gives the individual a reward 𝑊 > 0. If the decision does not 
match the state of the world, the payoff is zero. The utility function of the 
manager is therefore given by 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑊. 𝐼(𝑎𝑖), 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
where I(ai) is an indicator function defined as 
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In the beginning of period i, before making the decision, the individual 
receives a set  𝑆𝑖 = {𝑠1
𝑖 , 𝑠2
𝑖 , . 𝑠𝑁
𝑖 }. One and exactly one member of 𝑆𝑖  reveals 
the true state of the world wi. In the beginning of each period the decision 
maker learns the probability that each element reveals the true state of the 
world. That is, the decision maker learns 𝑓(𝑠𝑗), 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, . . , 𝑁}. Importantly, 
w1 and w2 are independent of each other, i.e., the state of the world in the 
second period is independent of the first period. Therefore, knowing the true 
w in the first period does not affect decision making in the second period. 
We can think of S as a general set containing N pieces of information of 
which exactly one reveals w in each period. 
In each period, the individual can research each 𝑠𝑗  by spending time 𝑡𝑗  and 
verify whether 𝑠𝑗  reveals w or not. However, it is impossible to research all 
members of S since ∑ 𝑡𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 > 𝑇 where T is the total time available per period 
and fixed in each period. When any element 𝑠𝑗  is researched in the first 
period, the individual can prepare a document (like keeping records) that 
facilitates researching the same element 𝑠𝑗  in the second period. That is, if an 
element 𝑠𝑗  is documented in the first period, the required research time 
reduces to 𝛼𝑡𝑗  in the second period. The parameter 𝛼 < 1 determines how 
effective documentation is in terms of saving time in the future. 
Documentation reduces research time only if the environment is more or less 
stable or if the element under research belongs to the subset of elements that 
are stable. We define stability as the probability that documentation in the 
first period reduces research time in the second period and denote it, for the 
element 𝑠𝑗, by βj. Therefore, documenting an element in the first period saves 
𝑡𝑗(1 − 𝛼) in the second period with probability βj. 
We are interested in the documentation decision by the individual. In 
order to do so, we need to analyze how the individual researches the 
elements in each period. 
5.1.1. Decision making in the second period 
The individual does not document anything in the second period since 
there is no future to use this documentation. The only decision to make is 
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deciding which 𝑠𝑗  to research. The program that the individual solves is 
given by; 
 
The decision variable 𝑒𝑗  indicates whether 𝑠𝑗  is researched or not. This 
problem cannot be solved analytically. It can be shown that this problem is a 
variant of the famous knapsack problem and so is NP-hard6 (Martello and 
Toth (1990)). However, if we assume, without loss of generality, that partial 
research is possible, then we can solve the problem. To do so, we need to 
replace 𝑒𝑗 ∈ {0,1} with 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑗  ≤ 1. If partial research is possible, an element 
𝑠𝑗  can be researched for a time period t that is shorter than it’s required 
research time t < 𝑡𝑗. The ex-ante probability of discovery then reduces to 
𝑓(𝑠𝑗)
𝑡
𝑡𝑗
. When partial research is possible, the optimal solution for the 
problem can be derived in two steps. First, we need to sort 𝑠𝑗  according to 
their informational density defined as 
𝐼𝑗 ≡
𝑓(𝑠𝑗)
𝑡𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, . . , 𝑁} 
Second, start researching the elements 𝑠𝑗  from the one with the highest 
density followed by the second highest and so on. 
LEMMA 2. The optimal search decision involves sorting elements 
according to their informational density and then researching the element 
 
6 NP-hardness means there is no algorithm that can solve this problem in a reasonable 
time when the problem becomes large. 
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from the one with the highest density and then the second highest and so on 
until time allows. 
Intuitively, an element that is more likely to be informative and can be 
researched in shorter time should have a higher priority over another element 
that is less informative or requires a longer time to research. Informational 
density plays a fundamental role in our analysis and so it is worthwhile to 
explore it further. Recall that f(𝑠𝑗) is the probability that element 𝑠𝑗  reveals 
the true state of the world. In other words, it a measure of informativeness of 
each element. Analyzing the relationship between informativeness and 
informational density is illuminating. We briefly review three cases to 
highlight this point. First, the case when all elements are equally likely to 
reveal the state of the world, f(𝑠𝑗) = 1/N. It follows immediately that 
informational density is higher for shorter elements and so these elements 
are more likely to be researched. Second, when informativeness is 
proportional to the research time, 
                                                       
It follows that informational density is independent of the research time and 
all elements have identical information densities. The reason is that the 
higher informational content of longer elements is offset by a higher research 
time. Finally, in case the informativeness of the elements increase 
disproportionately with their research times, longer elements will have a 
higher informational density. 
    5.1.2. First Period 
In the first period, the individual has to make a joint decision about 
researching and documenting. The optimization problem in the first period 
is 
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This problem is similar to the optimization problem in the second period but 
has an additional decision variable and an additional constraint. The 
additional decision variable 𝑒𝑖
𝑑 = {0,1, }  denotes the documentation 
decision and the additional constraint, (2), ensures that an element can be 
documented only if it has been researched. 𝜎∗ is the optimal strategy in the 
second period which entails adopting the solution approach of Lemma 2. 
Note that this problem is at least as hard as the original knapsack problem 
and therefore is NP-hard. It is, however, possible to introduce a solution that 
incorporates the documentation decision and optimizes the problem. The 
solution involves calculating the value of documentation for all elements, 
even those who are not initially supposed to be researched, and then deciding 
on documentation. Note that an element 𝑠𝑗  can be researched faster in the 
second period if it has been documented in the previous period, given that it 
is stable. That is, the research time decreases to 𝛼𝑡𝑗  with probability βj. The 
added value of this shorter research time can be stated in terms of 
informational density by introducing an updated informational density as 
                                                                                            (13) 
As expected, the value of documentation increases with the informational 
density and stability of the element. Next, note that if 
 
𝐼𝑗 ≤ 𝐼𝑗 
then there is no point in documenting element 𝑠𝑗  as it does not add value. 
When  
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𝐼𝑗 > 𝐼𝑗 we still need to check whether the added value of documenting 𝑠𝑗  
outweighs the associated costs. In order to do so we need to know the cost 
of documenting an element. The cost of documenting an element is actually 
the opportunity cost of the time that has to be allocated for documentation. 
This time could otherwise be allocated to researching, and possibly 
documenting, other elements. As a result, the cost of documenting an 
element increases with the research time. Once we determined the cost of 
documentation, we can compare the cost and benefit of documentation for 
the elements that satisfy 𝐼𝑗 > 𝐼𝑗. Intuitively, the benefits of documentation 
increase with the stability and decrease with research time. The following 
proposition summarizes the analysis of this section. 
PROPOSITION 5. The optimal solution to the documentation problem 
involves trading off the future benefits of enhanced informational density 
with the opportunity costs of time in the present. Documentation is more 
likely to be value enhancing for elements that have a higher informational 
density, are more stable and have a shorter documentation time. 
One implication of the solution to documentation is that an element that 
might not have been researched absent documentation, gets to be researched 
when documentation is possible. This happens when documentation reduces 
the research time considerably in the second period such that it becomes 
worthwhile to forgo some valuable research time in the first period. If the 
benefits of a reduction in the research time, in the second period, is at least 
as large as the value of the time that has to be allocated for research and 
documentation, then that element is worth documenting. This point can be 
demonstrated using our example of EMR with a twist. Assume that the 
treatment takes two periods. Recall that the doctor could ask for three 
medical tests: X-ray scan, blood test and physical examinations. Denote 
them by {A,B,C}, respectively. The probability that the test {A,B,C} reveals 
the disease is {1/4,1/4,1/2}, respectively. The time required for doing the test 
and receiving the interpretation is {1,1,3}, respectively. Finally, the total 
available time is 3 units in each period. In the absence of documentation, 
tests A and B a have higher informational density compared to C. According 
to Lemma (2) tests A and B should be performed completely. Test C can be 
performed partially due to the lack of time. That is, only 1/3 of it can be done. 
As a result, the probability of discovering the disease in each period is 
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(1/4+1/4+1/3×1/2=2/3). The overall probability of discovering the disease in 
the absence of documentation is 
 
Consider the same problem with documentation. Assume for simplicity that 
documentation time is negligible, td =0. In addition, documentation reduces 
the time required for doing test C by 1/3 but does not reduce the required 
times of the other two tests. Proposition 5 implies that test C should be 
completely performed and documented in the first period. Therefore, it 
becomes possible to do all the three tests in the second period. When it 
happens, the probability of discovery becomes 1/2 (only test C can be done) 
in the first period and 1 in the second period. Therefore, documentation 
allows the health care to discover the disease with certainty. This example 
highlights two points about documentation. First, documentation changes the 
set of activities that an organization undertake. Second, documentation can 
be a value enhancing activity. 
 
6. Extension 
6.1. Documentation and Incentives 
In the section §5, we assumed that the document is retrieved, in the second 
period, by the same person who created it in the first period. As a result, the 
interests of the composer and the retriever were fully aligned. In most real 
cases, however, people who document are not necessarily the same as those 
who use that document in the future. For example, secretaries oversee 
documenting the minutes of meetings and some other types of data in 
organizations. However, it is mostly other employees and managers who use 
these documents later. When this is the case, two types of problems might 
arise. First, managers might then become concerned whether the secretaries 
document with due diligence or not. This type of problem falls more or less 
into the category of moral hazard problems that has been extensively 
researched. Second, the manager decides about the content of the document 
knowing that the document will be used by her subordinates whose interests 
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might not be fully aligned with her. In this case, the manager’s concern is the 
effect of documentation on the behavior of the users of the document. 
For example, consider an investment firm who is researching multiple 
investment opportunities. For simplicity, suppose that investment choices 
are similar in terms of risk and return but can be made in different countries. 
So, the firm should decide where to invest. Each time the firm researches a 
specific country, the manager can instruct her subordinates to create a 
document that facilitates researching that country in the future. However, the 
manager is also aware that making a country easier to research might distort 
the incentives of her employees such that they research countries that have 
been documented, and hence are easier to research, than other countries 
which might be more promising. As a result, the manager may decide not to 
document or not fully document the process despite the potential benefits of 
documentation. Importantly, the adverse effects of documentation depend on 
how the manager compensates the employees who are involved in 
researching possible investment options. The weaker the link between the 
employees’ payments and the investment outcome, the stronger the effect of 
documentation on employees’ behavior. This section analyzes this problem. 
Consider the documentation problem we analyzed in §5 with two 
differences. First, all elements are identical in terms of informativeness, i.e., 
𝑓(𝑠𝑗) = 1/𝑁, 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. Second, there is a principal and an agent. The principal 
conducts the research and documentation in the first period. The agent 
retrieves the document, conducts the research and communicates the results 
to the principal in the second period. The principal can verify the message of 
the agent. That is, the principal can verify whether the agent has discovered 
the true state of the world and whether the agent has actually researched an 
element or not. The principal, however, cannot instruct the agent about the 
research strategy in the second period. It is the agent who decides how to 
conduct the research. The timing of the events is as follows. The principal 
determines the compensation package of the agent, the contract. The agent 
observes the contract and conducts the research. Payoffs are realized. Both 
parties are risk neutral. We are interested to investigate how documentation 
affects the behavior of the agent in the second period. In short, we would like 
to know how documentation induces the agent to research the elements of S. 
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Doing so requires us to know how the agent is compensated. A general linear 
contract takes the form of 
𝑦 + 𝑣𝑥 
where y is the bonus contingent on finding the true state of the world and v 
is a fixed, piece wise reward to be paid for researching each element 𝑠𝑗. The 
equilibrium strategy of the agent 𝜎∗ is straightforward. The agent will 
research as many elements as possible if v 6=0. Otherwise, if v =0, the agent 
researches as many elements as possible but stops immediately when he 
discovers the true state of the world. Next, note that the assumption regarding 
identical informational densities of elements implies that the optimal 
research strategy yields an expected surplus (probability discovery) of 
W(n/N), where n is the maximum number of elements that can be researched 
during a period out of a total N elements. It is known to both the principal 
and the agent. The principal determines the contract by solving the following 
problem 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦,𝑣 𝐸(𝑈𝑃|𝜎
∗) = 𝑊𝑏 − (𝑦 + 𝑣𝑥) 
                                                         s.t 
𝐸(𝑈𝐴|𝜎
∗) ≥ 𝜂𝑊(
𝑛
𝑁
) 
𝐸(𝑈𝑃|𝜎
∗) ≥ (1 − 𝜂)𝑊(
𝑛
𝑁
) 
 
where η denotes the bargaining power of the agent. Assume for simplicity 
that the employment market is competitive, i.e., η =1. All the surplus goes to 
the agent. There are many solutions for this problem given the strategy of 
the agent. The principal can offer only a piece wise contract (y = 0, v = W/N) 
or only a contingent bonus contract (y = W(n/N), v = 0). Any combination 
yielding the same value in expectation is also possible. Different modes of 
payment, contingent versus piece wise, result in the same value in 
expectation but induce a different behavior. Paying the agent per element 
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(piece wise) results in researching all possible elements even when the agent 
discovers the true state of the world after the first element. So, the risk is 
fully allocated to the principal. Fully contingent payment, on the other hand, 
results in stopping research after discovering the true state of the world but 
allocates all the risk to the agent. 
LEMMA 3. The optimal contract can include any combination of 
contingent and non-contingent clauses. Different types of contracts differ 
only in allocating the risk. 
The principal would like the agent to research as many elements as possible 
but stop immediately after discovery. To achieve this, the principal can offer 
a contingent based contract to the agent who would accept it. Therefore, the 
overall documentation strategy of the principal, in the first period, does not 
change from what it was under single agency. 
LEMMA 4. Documentation strategy is identical in a principal-agent 
setting as in a single agency, given that there is no information asymmetry. 
6.2. Information Asymmetry 
So far, we assumed that the agent did not have private information. We 
would like to know whether information asymmetry has consequences for 
documentation or not. To do the analysis, assume that the agent receives a 
private signal in the beginning of the second period implying that one of the 
elements, say 𝑠𝑗, is more informative than the rest of the elements. We call 
that element the indicated element. In terms of our model, the indicated 
element’s contribution to the discovery is p >1/N. That is, the indicated 
element has a higher informational density than the rest of the elements and 
an optimal research plan requires the indicated element to be always 
researched. Does the agent always research the indicated element? the 
answer depends on the contact. If the contract consists only of a contingent 
bonus, (y = W(n/N), v = 0), then the agent researches the indicated the 
element as it increases the chance of discovery more than other elements. If 
the contract has both a piece wise and a contingent bonus component (y ≠ 0, 
v ≠ 0), then the agent researches the indicated element only if the expected 
benefits of researching the indicated element outweighs its opportunity costs. 
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The opportunity cost refers to the minimum number of elements that the 
agent must give up in order to have time to research the indicated element. 
Denote this number by γ. The agent researches the indicated element if 
 
                                   𝑦(𝑝 −
𝛾
𝑁
) ≥ (𝛾 − 1)𝑣                                             (14)   
 
The first best decision, however, requires the agent to research the 
indicated element when 
                                         𝑦(𝑝 −
𝛾
𝑁
) ≥ 0                                                   (15) 
comparing (14) and (15) we see that the first best does not emerge unless γ 
=1 or v =0. Therefore, the optimal contract, in the presence of private 
information, contains only of a contingent bonus. If for any reason the 
contract has a piece wise component, due to the agent being risk averse for 
instance, then the first best decision does not emerge. 
LEMMA 5. In the presence of private information, the optimal contract 
consists only of a contingent bonus. 
Given the behavior of the agent, the decision for documentation in the first 
period is not as simple as it was before. On the one hand, documentation 
reduces the required research time of elements and therefore, increases the 
opportunity costs of researching the indicated element whenever the 
indicated element is not in the research list. On the other hand, 
documentation increases the number of elements that can be researched in a 
period and so increases the chance that the indicated element becomes part 
of the research list. 
 
7.  Conclusion and Further Research 
This paper analyzes the effects of documentation in organizations. 
Documentation is defined as a history that shows the actions done and/or 
information known in the past. We show that documentation is a multi-
purpose activity that cannot be understood by any single model. Therefore, 
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we present three models, each analyzing documentation from a specific point 
of view. We identify three main roles for documentation. 
First, documentation is analyzed in a principal-agent setting when there is 
information asymmetry. The model shows that documentation is not always 
beneficial for the principal but can also be detrimental or lead to path 
dependency. Second, we analyze documentation as a tool for saving time in 
the future when people have limited memory and limited time. Finally, we 
study documentation as a way of providing a certificate to the parties to an 
agreement that protects them against a possible breach from the other party. 
This paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, that studies 
documentation explicitly. As a result, we can think of various paths to 
advance the theory and develop models that enhance our understanding of 
documentation. One specific area is to study the medium of documentation. 
This paper does not distinguish between different mediums and their relative 
costs and effectiveness. With the new developments in information 
technology, however, the costs and benefits of documentation has changes 
from what it was in the age paper and pen. 
 Next, there are lots of unexplored questions about the effect of 
documentation in shaping incentives and affecting the behavior of those who 
compose documents and those who use these documents later. This paper 
studied one important aspect in the section §3 and another one in §6. Section 
§3 analyzes what we believe to be a key function of documentation, 
enforcing consistency. Our analysis assumed a specific information structure 
for the sake of clarity and feasibility. It is very important to extend the 
analysis to other types of information structures to see how results change. 
The analysis in §6 is brief and uses restrictive assumptions in order to stay 
focused on one topic. A promising way for future research on documentation 
is studying the subject when the assumptions are relaxed. 
Finally, and probably the most important agenda for future research, is the 
role of documents in showing the information available to the decision 
makers in various points of time. In order to evaluate the performance of a 
decision maker, it is crucial to know what she knew at the time of decision 
making. Documents can show the information available to the decision 
maker but if the decision makers know this in advance, then she might decide 
to stop documentation in the first place. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 2 
The problem is the binary knapsack problem with probabilities being the 
value of elements and their corresponding research time as their weights. 
Relaxing the integrality of 𝑒𝑖  the optimal solution, according to Dantzig 
(1957) involves sorting elements decreasingly according to 
𝑓(.)
𝑡
 and start 
researching the first element, then the second and so on until time allows. 
All elements are completely researched except the last one that might be 
researched partially. To show that this solution is optimal, suppose that 
elements are sorted according to 
𝑓(.)
𝑡
 and the last element that can be 
researched is g. Assume, contrary to the proposed solution, that an element 
𝑖 <  𝑔 is not researched fully. It then implies that another element 𝑗 > 𝑔 
can be partially researched instead. This is because the optimal solution 
should use all the available time. Therefore, we can increase the research 
time of the element 𝑖 by > 0 and decrease the research time of 𝑗 by 𝜖
𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑗
. 
This results in an increase in the probability of discovery by (𝑓(𝑠𝑖) −
𝑓(𝑠𝑗)
𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑗
) that is positive since 
𝑓(𝑠𝑖)
𝑡𝑖
>
𝑓(𝑠𝑗)
𝑡𝑗
, a contradiction. In the same vein, 
researching elements after g results in a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
The value of documenting an element Wi can be calculated as follows. First 
define 𝐼𝑖 as 
                                                                                                 (16) 
if 𝐼𝑖 < 𝐼𝑖  then𝐼𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖  otherwise if 𝐼𝑖 > 𝐼𝑖then 𝐼𝑖  is defined as in (16). Next, 
denote the ordered research set by R. This is the set whose elements are 
chosen to be researched using Dantzig method and elements are ordered from 
the first element to the last. Consider the last element ss and its informational 
density Is. If 𝐼𝑖 < 𝐼𝑠, then Wi =0. Otherwise, use Dantzig method for the 
knapsack problem and calculate the total probability of discovery with the 
updated informational density for the element 𝑠𝑖  in period 𝑡 ∈ {1,2} and 
denote it by 𝑉𝑡(𝐼𝑖, 𝐼𝑗≠𝑖) Then compare it with the same discovery probability 
using the initial informational density Ii and denote it by 𝑉𝑡(𝐼𝑖, 𝐼𝑗≠𝑖). Finally, 
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the sum of the differences between the probabilities of discovery in period 1 
and 2 gives the total value of documenting the element. That is 
              (17) 
We can calculate the value of documentation for all elements in the grand 
set S and store them in a set W. 
 Next, the cost of documentation of an element 𝑠𝑖  equals the sum of the 
values of elements that have to be given up in order to have sufficient time 
for documenting element𝑠𝑖. This forgone value depends on the elements that 
are given up. As a result, we need to know which elements have to be given 
up. We should proceed as follows. First, the value of documentation Wi for 
all elements is calculated from (17). Next, elements of W are sorted in an 
increasing order. That is, from the lowest to the second lowest and so on. 
𝑊1  ≤ 𝑊2  ≤. . . ≤ 𝑊𝑁 
Next, define the set of elements that are currently chosen to be researched 
by R and denote the last element in R by 𝑠𝑠. The number of elements that 
have to be given up is 
                            𝑇𝑁 =  𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗  ∑ 𝑡𝑠−𝑗
𝑠
𝑗=0,𝑗≠𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑖
𝑑   (18) 
if element ss is in the list of research a priori or 
                        𝑇𝑁 =  𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗  ∑ 𝑡𝑠−𝑗
𝑠
𝑗=0,𝑗≠𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑖
𝑑 + 𝑡𝑖 (19) 
otherwise. The value that has to be given up is 
                             𝑇𝐶 =  ∑ 𝑓(𝑠𝑠−𝑖) + 𝛼𝑓(𝑠𝑇𝑁)
𝑇𝑁−1
𝑖=1  (20) 
where α is defined as 
 
Next, we begin with the first element of the set W. If W1 >TC and the 
element W1 is in the research list, then we update the research list R and 
decide to document the element. If the element is not in the research list, then 
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we put it in the research list and update S. If W1 ≤ TC, then we do nothing 
and move on to the next element W2. This process is repeated until the last 
element WN. 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Consider the condition 
 
Note that the term (−1 + (1 − 2𝑞)
𝛿
1−𝛿
) in the left hand side is less than 
𝛿
1−𝛿
(1 − 𝑞 − 𝑝1𝜎1) on the right hand side whereas the other term (1 −
𝑞)
1
1−𝛿
 is larger than it for any 𝑞 ≤ 1. In addition, 
𝑝2𝜎2
𝑞
= 1 −
𝑝1𝜎1
𝑞
. The left 
hand side is a convex combination of two terms, one larger and one smaller 
than the right hand side. As a result, there must be a lower bound for value 
for  𝑝2𝜎2 = 1 − 𝑝1𝜎1such that the inequality holds when p2σ2 is at least as 
large the lower bound. Q.E.D.  
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion 
 
Chapter one introduces the thesis by reviewing the trajectory of 
development of information economics from a historic perspective. Then 
each chapter is introduced by explaining the research questions, relevance 
and the solution approach.     
Chapter two researches the governance structure of partnerships when 
members are heterogeneous in terms of the value of their outside options and 
knowledgeability (expertise).  To account for the heterogeneity, the paper 
assumes two types of members: juniors and Seniors. Seniors have more 
valuable outside option than Juniors. The paper analyzes decision making 
and communication in three types of markets that differ in the availability of 
attractive business opportunities. Three results are established. First, we 
show that market and governance structure are intertwined. In markets with 
few attractive opportunities, mature markets, decision rights is more likely to 
be granted to Seniors as these members are more vulnerable. That is, they are 
more likely to incur loss from implementing projects that yield less than their 
outside option. In markets with abundant attractive projects, nascent markets, 
decision rights is more likely to be granted to Juniors. Intuitively, Juniors are 
more vulnerable in this type of market. Their vulnerability, however, results 
from missing promising projects rather than implementing inferior projects. 
Finally, in markets that are somewhere in between the other two markets, 
mixed market, both member types are vulnerable and therefore, 
heterogeneous partnerships are not viable. In either the mature or nascent 
market, the member type who is not granted the decision rights joins the 
partnership only if s/he is not highly knowledgeable. Otherwise that type is 
better off operating in an independent, homogeneous partnership. This 
explains why partnerships where Juniors are granted the decision rights are 
rare. This requires the Seniors not to be highly knowledgeable. Second, our 
analysis identifies the efficient governance structure in each market type. We 
show that the efficiency of governance structures depends on the 
knowledgeability of the member type whose preference is more in line with 
the market, i.e., Seniors in the mature market and Juniors in the nascent 
market. In the mature market if Seniors are highly knowledgeable, then it is 
more efficient to grant decision rights to them. Otherwise, Juniors should be 
granted the decision rights. The same applies in the nascent market. If Juniors 
are highly knowledgeable, then they should hold the decision rights. 
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Otherwise Seniors should hold the decision rights. Finally, the paper studies 
the effect of repeated interactions on the viability of heterogeneous 
partnerships. It is known that if people expect to interact frequently with each 
other in the future, then cooperative behaviors can be sustained given that 
individuals are patient. Our analysis shows that if heterogeneous members 
are patient enough, then the efficient governance structure is viable in all 
markets. It happens because with frequent interactions, the prospect of gains 
from cooperative behavior in the future, outweighs the short-term gain from 
strategic behavior. Therefore, when people are patient, i.e., care sufficiently 
about the future, they can forgo the short-term benefits of strategic behavior.                                      
Chapter three studies social image (status) in organizations and 
overconfidence both in organizations and also from an individual 
perspective. In the organizational context, the paper aims to provide an 
explanation for two observations that seem to be in conflict. On the one hand, 
most people overrate themselves in terms of skills and ability, i.e., are 
overconfident. On the other hand, overconfident managers are shown to be 
more successful in eliciting effort and commitment from their followers and 
peers, compared to mangers who are not overconfident. The paper assumes 
an organization consisting of a manager and two types of followers. One type 
of followers, called experts, are rational, i.e., use Bayes rule in forming and 
updating beliefs. The other type, called non-experts, are less rational, i.e., do 
not use the Bayes rule in forming and updating beliefs. The manager is either 
high ability or low ability. In addition, the manager can be either confident 
or unconfident. The paper establishes three results. First, it shows that experts 
might prefer confident managers to unconfident managers, even when low 
ability managers are more likely to be confident than high ability manager 
and experts are aware of it. This happens because non-experts associate  
confidence with ability and therefore, think that a confident manager is a high 
ability one. Experts are aware that non-expert associate confidence with 
ability and know that non-experts exert a higher effort when the manager is 
confident, compared to the case when the manager is unconfident. If the 
higher effort of the non-experts compensates the manager's ability slack, 
because confident managers are less likely to be high ability, then the experts 
would also prefer a confident manager to an unconfident manager despite 
knowing the relationship between confidence and ability is dubious. In short, 
the paper shows that managerial confidence can increase the output if two 
conditions are met. First, a large portion of followers believe that confidence 
is associated with competence. Second, managerial input is highly 
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substitutable with followers' input. Next, the paper shows how the manager's 
concern for her social image (status) affects her decision making. Social 
image concern results in implementing inferior projects when reversing 
damages, the social image of the manager. This happens when followers 
expect decisiveness from managers. It might seem that managers with a very 
high status are more vulnerable to image loss and therefore are more likely 
to implement inferior projects. The analysis shows that this intuition is wrong 
since the high-status managers are less vulnerable to image loss than 
managers with lower status. Status loss, resulting from reversing, is non-
monotonic in the initial status. The status loss initially increases, reaches a 
maximum and then decreases afterwards. As a result, status loss is mostly the 
problem of managers with middle stats. 
Chapter 4 researches documentation. It analyzes how documentation 
affect communication and decision making in organizations. The paper 
defines a document as a piece of information whose content is not verifiable 
but the very existence of it is indisputable. Documentation is a multi-purpose, 
multi- faceted activity that is widely practiced but less explored. The paper 
identifies three functions for documents. First, documents improve 
communication in a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information. 
The model assumes that the raw information that the agent receives is 
observable by the principal, but she cannot interpret the information. It is the 
private information of the agent. With documentation, the principal can 
observe the interpretation of agent in the past and therefore, the agent has to 
be consistent when interpreting information. In other words, documentation 
shows how the agent communicated in the past upon receiving certain type 
of information. This history, then ties the hand of the agent because the agent 
cannot communicate differently with the same type of information at later 
times. In short, documentation enforces consistency and this consistency in 
turn forces the agent to communicate more informatively. The analysis 
shows that the enforced consistency is not always beneficial, but it might 
backfire. Whether documentation improves communication or backfires, 
depends on two factors. First, it depends on the magnitude of divergence of 
interests. If the interests are too divergent, then documentation backfires. The 
agent would prefer to systematically mislead the principal. Second, the agent 
should be sufficiently patient if documentation is going to be beneficial. 
Intuitively, if the agent is not patient, i.e., does not care sufficiently about the 
future, then documentation loses its grip as consistency becomes less 
important for the agent. Next, the paper shows that documentation serves as 
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a certification for an agreement. In this case, an agreement consists of a set 
of promises. The parties to an agreement can observe these promises. 
Documentation makes the promises observable by a third party. The distance 
of the possible third parties, from the parties to the agreement, can vary. The 
farthest distance from the parties are courts. The distance of the third-party 
matters because the set of observable promises shrinks as the distance 
increases. That is, a third party that is closer to the parties of an agreement 
can observe more element of the agreement (promises) than another third 
party who sits at a farther distance. For example, in a multi-division 
company, the CEO can observe more elements of an agreement between two 
division managers compared to a judge. So, the distance of the third party 
determines the observability of the agreement for that party. Another 
difference between the possible third parties are their ability to enforce the 
promises. This time, the more distant the third party, the more powerful s/he 
becomes in terms of enforcing the promises. In the previous example of a 
multi-division company, a judge is more powerful than the CEO when it 
comes to enforce an agreement. As a result, the parties to an agreement, 
choose the third party by making a tradeoff between observability and 
enforceability. Once the place of the third party is determined, the 
corresponding type of document is composed. In the multi-division 
company, if the two-division manager choose the CEO as the third party, 
then the document takes the form of a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU). If the third party is a judge, then the document takes the form of a  
contract. Finally, the paper analyzes the role of documentation as a saving 
tool. Organizations save time by documenting repetitive tasks. The analysis 
shows that documentation becomes more effective when tasks are stable. In 
addition, documentation might change the courses of action that an 
organization takes. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Deze thesis onderzoekt communicatie en besluitvorming in organisaties. 
Er zijn in totaal vijf hoofdstukken, inclusief het huidige hoofdstuk. 
Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert de thesis door een bespreking van de geschiedenis 
van de ontwikkeling van de informatie-economie. Vervolgens wordt elk 
hoofdstuk vooraf gegaan door een uitleg over de onderzoeksvragen, hun 
relevantie en de oplossingsbenadering. 
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de bestuursstructuur van partnerschappen 
wanneer haar leden heterogeen (verschillend) zijn wat betreft de waarde van 
hun externe mogelijkheden en deskundigheid (expertise). Om de 
heterogeniteit te verklaren, gaat het artikel uit van twee soorten leden: 
junioren en senioren. Senioren hebben meer waardevolle externe 
mogelijkheden dan junioren. Het artikel analyseert de besluitvorming en 
communicatie in drie soorten markten die verschillen op het gebied van de 
beschikbaarheid van interessante zakelijke kansen. Er worden drie resultaten 
vastgesteld. Als eerste laten we zien dat markt- en bestuursstructuren met 
elkaar zijn verbonden. In markten met weinig aantrekkelijke kansen 
(ontwikkelde markten) is de kans groter dat besluitvormingsrechten worden 
toegekend aan senioren omdat deze leden kwetsbaarder zijn. Dat wil zeggen 
dat de kans groter is dat ze verlies lijden door het implementeren van 
projecten die minder opleveren dan hun externe mogelijkheid. In markten 
met legio aantrekkelijke projecten (opkomende markten) is de kans groter 
dat besluitvormingsrechten worden toegekend aan junioren. Junioren zijn 
gevoelsmatig kwetsbaarder in dit type markt. Hun kwetsbaarheid komt 
echter eerder door het over het hoofd zien van veelbelovende projecten dan 
door het implementeren van slechte projecten. Ten slotte zijn beide typen 
leden kwetsbaar in markten die ergens tussen de andere twee markten in 
zitten (gemengde markten) en daarom zijn heterogene partnerschappen niet 
geschikt. In zowel ontwikkelde als opkomende markten treedt alleen het type 
leden zonder besluitvormingsrechten toe tot het partnerschap toe als hij/zij 
niet heel deskundig is. In andere gevallen functioneert dat type beter in een 
onafhankelijk, homogeen partnerschap. Dit verklaart de zeldzaamheid van 
partnerschappen waarin de besluitvormingsrechten aan junioren worden 
toegekend. Een vereiste hiervoor is dat senioren niet heel deskundig zijn. Ten 
tweede stelt onze analyse voor elk markttype vast welke bestuursstructuur 
het meest efficiënt is. We tonen aan dat de efficiëntie van bestuursstructuren 
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afhangt van de kennis van het type leden van wie de voorkeur meer in 
overeenstemming is met de markt: d.w.z. senioren in ontwikkelde markten 
en junioren in opkomende markten. Als senioren in ontwikkelde markten 
zeer deskundig zijn, is het efficiënter om de besluitvormingsrechten aan hen 
toe te kennen. Anders moeten de besluitvormingsrechten aan junioren 
worden toegekend. Hetzelfde geldt voor opkomende markten. Als junioren 
zeer deskundig zijn, dan moeten zij de besluitvormingsrechten hebben. 
Anders moeten senioren de besluitvormingsrechten hebben. Tot slot wordt 
in dit artikel het effect van herhaalde interacties op de levensvatbaarheid van 
heterogene partnerschappen onderzocht. Het is bekend dat mensen die 
verwachten dat ze in de toekomst vaak met elkaar zullen omgaan, coöperatief 
gedrag blijven vertonen, op voorwaarde dat zij geduldig zijn. Uit onze 
analyse blijkt dat als heterogene leden geduldig genoeg zijn, de efficiënte 
bestuursstructuur in dat geval in alle markten levensvatbaar is. Dit is het 
geval omdat het vooruitzicht op toekomstige door samenwerking behaalde 
winst opweegt tegen korte termijn gewin door strategisch gedrag in situaties 
met veelvuldige communicatie. Wanneer mensen geduldig zijn en 
bijvoorbeeld het belang van de toekomst inzien, kunnen ze daarom de korte 
termijn voordelen van strategisch gedrag terzijde schuiven. 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt het sociale beeld (status) in organisaties en 
daarnaast overmoed in zowel organisaties als vanuit een individueel 
perspectief. Binnen de organisatorische context probeert het artikel een 
verklaring te geven voor twee ogenschijnlijk tegenstrijdige observaties. 
Enerzijds overschatten de meeste mensen zichzelf op het gebied van 
vaardigheden en competenties: ze zijn bijvoorbeeld overmoedig. Aan de 
andere kant zien we dat overmoedige managers succesvoller zijn in het 
genereren van betrokkenheid en inspanningsbereidheid bij hun volgers en 
collega's, in vergelijking met managers die niet overmoedig zijn. Het artikel 
gaat uit van een organisatie die bestaat uit een manager en twee soorten 
volgers. Eén soort volger, de deskundige genoemd, is rationeel en gebruikt 
bijvoorbeeld de stelling van Bayes bij het vormen en bijstellen van 
overtuigingen. De andere soort, de niet-deskundige genoemd, is minder 
rationeel. Deze maakt bijvoorbeeld geen gebruik van de Bayes-stelling bij 
het vormen en bijstellen van overtuigingen. De manager is óf zeer deskundig 
óf weinig deskundig. Daarnaast kan de manager zelfverzekerd zijn of 
onzeker. Het artikel stelt drie resultaten vast. Allereerst wordt aangetoond dat 
deskundigen de voorkeur kunnen hebben voor zelfverzekerde managers 
boven onzekere managers. Zelfs wanneer een manager met een geringe 
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deskundigheid meer zelfvertrouwen heeft dan een manager die zeer 
deskundig is en de deskundigen zich daarvan bewust zijn. Dit gebeurt omdat 
niet-deskundigen zelfvertrouwen associëren met deskundigheid en daarom 
denken dat een zelfverzekerde manager deskundig is. Deskundigen zijn zich 
ervan bewust dat niet-deskundigen zelfvertrouwen associëren met 
deskundigheid. Ze weten ook dat niet-deskundigen zich meer inspannen als 
de manager zelfverzekerd is, vergeleken met een situatie waarin de manager 
onzeker is. Als de grotere inspanningen van de niet-deskundigen de 
deskundigheid van de manager compenseren omdat zelfverzekerde managers 
meestal minder deskundig zijn, dan zouden de deskundigen ook de voorkeur 
aan een zelfverzekerde manager moeten geven boven een onzekere manager, 
ondanks het feit dat zij weten dat de relatie tussen zelfvertrouwen en 
deskundigheid twijfelachtig is. Samenvattend toont het artikel aan dat het 
zelfvertrouwen van een leidinggevende tot betere resultaten kan leiden 
wanneer er aan twee voorwaarden wordt voldaan. Ten eerste gelooft een 
groot deel van de volgers dat zelfvertrouwen samenhangt met competentie. 
Ten tweede zijn kan de bijdrage van de leidinggevende uitstekend worden 
vervangen door de bijdragen van de volgers. Vervolgens laat het artikel zien 
hoe de aandacht van de manager voor zijn/haar sociale beeld (status) invloed 
heeft op zijn/haar besluitvorming. Het belang van het sociale beeld leidt tot 
het implementeren van inferieure projecten indien het niet-implementeren 
ervoor zorgt dat het sociale imago van de manager schade oploopt. Dit 
gebeurt wanneer volgers besluitvaardigheid van managers verwachten. Het 
lijkt misschien dat managers met een zeer hoge status kwetsbaarder zijn voor 
statusverlies, en daarom eerder geneigd zijn inferieure projecten te 
implementeren. De analyse toont echter aan dat deze aanname verkeerd is 
omdat managers met een hoge status minder gevoelig zijn voor statusverlies 
dan managers met een lagere status. Statusverlies als gevolg van het 
terugdraaien van beslissingen is in eerste instantie niet-monotonisch. Het 
statusverlies neemt aanvankelijk toe, bereikt vervolgens een maximum en 
neemt daarna af. Hierdoor is statusverlies voornamelijk problematisch voor 
managers met middelmatige kwaliteiten. Tot slot wordt in dit artikel 
overmoed bestudeerd vanuit een interpersoonlijk perspectief. De analyse 
toont aan dat overmoed ontstaat door een combinatie van optimisme en een 
beperkt geheugen. Iemand die optimistisch is, verwacht dat hij/zij in de 
toekomst beter zal presteren dan in het heden. Dit optimisme kan voortkomen 
uit een op groei gerichte mindset waarbij de persoon verwacht te leren van 
zijn/haar ervaringen. Ook kan het komen door alvast te genieten van datgene 
wat in de toekomst gaat komen. In ieder geval houdt optimisme in dat iemand 
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verwacht dat hij/zij in de toekomst in staat zal zijn om moeilijkere taken uit 
te voeren die een hogere beloning hebben. Een beperkt geheugen impliceert 
daarentegen dat iemand vergeet dat zijn/haar vaardigheid is verbeterd als het 
gaat om het uitvoeren van toekomstige taken. Daarom heeft de persoon een 
drijfveer om zijn/haar zelfbeoordeling positief te vertekenen. Met andere 
woorden, de persoon vormt een inschatting over zijn/haar vaardigheid in het 
heden binnen een specifieke context. De persoon verwacht dat zijn/haar 
vaardigheid toeneemt of groter is binnen andere contexten. Daarnaast is de 
persoon zich ervan bewust dat hij/zij dit punt zal vergeten. Dit heeft als 
gevolg dat de persoon een drijfveer heeft om zijn/haar vaardigheid te 
overschatten. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt onderzoek gedaan naar documentatie. Er wordt 
geanalyseerd op welke manier documentatie invloed heeft op de 
communicatie en besluitvorming in organisaties. Het artikel definieert een 
document als informatie waarvan de inhoud niet te controleren is, maar 
waarvan het bestaan een feit is. Documentatie is een multifunctionele, 
veelzijdige handeling die veel wordt toegepast maar niet vaak wordt 
onderzocht. In het artikel worden drie functies van documenten vastgesteld. 
Ten eerste verbeteren documenten de communicatie in een principaal-agent 
situatie waarin sprake is van asymmetrische informatie. Het model 
veronderstelt dat de ruwe informatie die de agent ontvangt waarneembaar is 
door de principaal. Deze kan de informatie echter niet interpreteren. Het is 
namelijk de privé-informatie van de agent. Met behulp van documentatie kan 
de principaal de interpretatie van de agent in het verleden observeren. Om 
deze reden moet de agent consistent zijn bij het interpreteren van informatie. 
Met andere woorden: documentatie laat zien hoe de agent in het verleden 
communiceerde na het ontvangen van bepaalde soorten informatie. Deze 
geschiedenis beperkt de agent vervolgens in zijn handelen, omdat de agent 
op een later moment niet anders kan communiceren op basis van hetzelfde 
type informatie. Kort gezegd dwingt documentatie consistentie af. Door deze 
consistentie is de agent op zijn beurt gedwongen om op een meer 
informatieve manier te communiceren. De analyse toont aan dat deze 
afgedwongen consistentie niet altijd gunstig is, maar ook een averechts effect 
kan hebben. De vraag of documentatie voor betere communicatie zorgt of 
juist een averechts effect heeft, is afhankelijk van twee factoren. Ten eerste 
hangt het af van het vooroordeel van de agent. Als de agent te bevooroordeeld 
is, dan heeft documentatie een averechts effect. Wanneer hij te 
bevooroordeeld is en documentatie aanwezig is, kan de agent de voorkeur 
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geven aan het systematisch misleiden van de principaal. Ten tweede moet de 
agent voldoende geduldig zijn voordat documentatie nuttig wordt. Als de 
agent niet geduldig is en zich bijvoorbeeld niet voldoende bekommert over 
de toekomst, dan wordt het belang van documentatie minder omdat de agent 
consistentie minder belangrijk vindt. Vervolgens laat het artikel zien dat 
documentatie dient als bewijs voor een overeenkomst. In dit geval bestaat 
een overeenkomst uit een reeks beloften. De partijen die bij een 
overeenkomst zijn betrokken, kunnen deze beloften nakomen. Documentatie 
zorgt ervoor dat deze beloften waarneembaar zijn voor een derde partij. De 
afstand van de mogelijke derden tot de bij de overeenkomst betrokken 
partijen kan variëren. De rechtbank is het verst verwijderd van de partijen. 
De afstand van de derde partij is belangrijk omdat de reeks van 
waarneembare beloften afneemt naarmate de afstand toeneemt. Dat wil 
zeggen dat een derde partij die dichter bij de bij de overeenkomst betrokken 
partijen staat, meer elementen van de overeenkomst (beloften) kan 
waarnemen dan een andere derde partij die zich op een grotere afstand 
bevindt. Zo kan de CEO van een bedrijf met meerdere divisies bijvoorbeeld 
meer elementen zien van een overeenkomst tussen twee divisiemanagers dan 
een rechter. De afstand van de derde partij bepaalt dus de waarneembaarheid 
van de overeenkomst voor die partij. Een ander verschil tussen de mogelijke 
derden is hun vermogen om het nakomen van de beloften af te dwingen. 
Hiervoor geldt dat hoe groter de afstand van de derde partij is, des te 
machtiger hij/zij wordt wat betreft het afdwingen van de beloften. In het 
vorige voorbeeld van een bedrijf met meerdere divisies is een rechter 
machtiger dan de CEO als het gaat om het afdwingen van een overeenkomst. 
Als gevolg daarvan kiezen de partijen bij een overeenkomst voor een 
bepaalde derde partij door een afweging te maken tussen waarneembaarheid 
en afdwingbaarheid. Zodra de positie van de derde partij is bepaald, wordt 
het overeenkomstige type document samengesteld. Als de twee 
divisiemanagers in het bedrijf met veel divisies kiezen voor de CEO als derde 
partij, krijgt het document de vorm van een memorandum van 
overeenstemming (MoU). Als de derde partij een rechter is, wordt het 
document een contract. Tot slot analyseert het artikel de rol van documentatie 
als een opslaghulpmiddel. Organisaties besparen tijd door het documenteren 
van repetitieve taken. De analyse toont aan dat documentatie effectiever 
wordt wanneer taken niet veranderen. Bovendien kan documentatie zorgen 
voor een verandering van de gang van zaken van een organisatie. 
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